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United Nations Development Agenda. The policy notes are intended to provide those 
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advantage of and expand their policy space  - their effective room for maneuver in 
formulating and integrating national economic, social, and environmental policies.  
 
I encourage readers to see these notes as complementary inputs into the debate at the 
country level on development challenges faced and the policies needed to meet them. 
The issues chosen  are vital pieces of the policy mosaic that underlies national 
development strategies, which are ultimately geared to achieving sustained economic 
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 MACROECONOMICS AND GROWTH POLICY NOTE* 
  
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1990s, many developing countries have had remarkable success in reducing 
inflation, as well as improving fiscal and current account deficits. Yet, countries have 
not been as successful at achieving stability of macroeconomic output and sustainable 
growth. This is in large part because stabilization policies have  focused  on price 
stability – even though real stability, not price stability, is what’s ultimately important 
for attracting investment and achieving sustainable development.  
 
This policy note lays out a framework for designing macroeconomic policy geared 
toward real macroeconomic stability  with growth. This framework is based on the 
view that there need to be broader  goals, additional instruments beyond fiscal and 
monetary policies (including  capital account management, regulations, and other 
micro economic tools), and a balanced role for government and the private sector. In 
addition, policymakers need  to coordinate fiscal, monetary, exchange rate policies and 
design programs based on flexibility and the individual needs of each country.  
 
This note is divided into three sections. The first discusses macroeconomic objectives, 
and the need for a broader set of policy goa ls. The second examines the conventional 
tools of macroeconomic policymaking: fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. 
The third and final section of this note looks at alternative tools for macroeconomic 
management, with an emphasis on interventions in capital markets. Some of the issues 
discussed, such as public sector revenue mobilization, are relevant to current policy 
choices in both low income and middle income countries. Some sections, such as aid 
modalities, aid and the ‘Dutch disease’, and to some extent, direct mechanisms of 
monetary policy, are geared toward low income countries. Many issues, such as some 
of the discussion on prudential regulatory structures and accounting for structural 
deficits, are more appropriate for middle income countries with greater administrative 
capacity. But we hope the discussion will give all policymakers ideas of creative 
measures that can be used to overcome market failures. 
 
II.   MACROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
 
We begin our discussion by focusing on the objectives o f macro -economic 
policymaking. At the most general level, the goal of economic policy is to maximize 
long-run societal well-being in an  equitable and  sustainable manner. Much of the 
recent discussion of economic policy has focused on intermediate variables, such as 
price stability or the balance of payments. Intermediate variables, however, are not 
important in their own right. Their importance derives largely from their role as 
possible indicators of economic performance in terms of truly significant varia bles, 
such as growth, development and equity. For example, price stability should be seen 
as a tool for achieving important long-run objectives, such as greater efficiency and 
long-term growth. The centre of attention of macroeconomic policymaking should b e 
                                                  
* This Policy Note has been prepared by Shari Spiegel, Director, Initiative for Policy Dialogue, 
Columbia University Business School, New York. All comments and queries can be sent to 
esa@un.org   7 
on  ‘real macroeconomics’ and the use of productive capacity—the employment of 
capital and  labour at their highest potential level —and  improvements in  that 
productivity.  
 
Stabilization and Growth 
 
What people truly care about i s the stability and growth  of their real incomes.  It 
should be obvious why growth is important: even small changes in the rate of growth, 
say, from 2.5  per cent to 3  per cent, add up significantly over time because of the 
effect of compounding. With a growth rate of 2.5  per cent, incomes double every 28 
years; with a growth rate of 3 per cent, they double every 23 years.  
 
It’s the overall stability of output and  the real economy, and not just price stability, 
that concerns firms when they make investment decisions. High instability  generates 
an ‘unfriendly’ domestic macro-environment that appears to be a crucial factor in 
explaining low rates of capital formation: firms have less incentive to invest, and 
growth will be lower. Similarly, economic policies that lead to fuller utilization of 
resources today may also lead to higher incomes in the future. This implies that there 
may be less of a trade-off between growth and stability than orthodox economics 
suggests. 
 
Issues of stabilization and growth cannot be separated. In general, the conduct of 
short-run stabilization policy has long-term effects. If the economy’s output is 
lowered 10 per cent today, the best estimate is that the output path will be 10 per cent 
lower than it otherwise would have been ten years from now. That means that most 
downturns have long lasting effects, regardless of causes.  
 
There are several links between stabilization (and how it’s pursued)  and growth.  
Relying on alternative measures to stabilize the economy (such as the government 
expenditures used by Korea and Malaysia during the Asian crisis, or the regulations 
on capital inflows used by Chile and Malaysia during boom periods in the 1990s) may 
have less adverse effects on long-term growth than relying exclusively on modifying 
interest rates.  An exclusive or even excessive focus on price stability can have a 




Although mainstream economics has focused on price stability as one of its primary 
policy objectives, there is considerable confusion as to its role. High inflation is said 
to signal that the government (fiscal and monetary authorities)  is not doing its job 
well. Inflation is thus a variable that is of concern not in its own right, but as an 
indicator of economic mal-performance. There are, however, two problems with this 
analysis. First, many people have started to view the indicator as the policy objective 
itself.  Second, the links between inflation and  real variables may be weaker than 
usually assumed.  
 
All economic policies involve trade-offs, the question here is whether the benefits of 
further reducing inflation outweigh its costs. Since 1991 most developed and 
developing countries have experienced low or moderate inflation, with many 
countries experiencing relatively low inflation. When inflation is low or moderate,   8 
efforts to reduce it further may have smaller benefits and increasing costs, especially 
when traditional contractionary monetary policy is the only instrument used to fight it. 
As we’ll discuss below, this may dampen employment in the short-term and growth in 
the longer-term. 
 
Much of the importance placed on fighting inflation in developing countries today 
stems from the history of hyperinflation in several Latin American countries in the 
1980s. There were also episodes of very high inflation in some transition economies 
of central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. But countries in Asia have rarely 
experienced hyperinflation, and the African experiences  have  been  quite different 
from the Latin American experiences. 
 
There is general agreement that hyperinflation has large economic costs, and that 
defeating it should be a top priority. Hyperinflation, and even high and uncertain 
inflation, creates huge uncertainty about changes in relative prices, which can be 
devastating for the information quality of prices and for the efficiency with which 
resources are used. Behaviour gets distorted as firms and individuals work to spend 
money quickly, before it diminishes in value. In some countries, huge amounts have 
been spent on institutional arrangements to  protect individuals from the effects of 
inflation.  Under more moderate inflation levels (let’s say 15 to  20 per cent), these 
costs will be much lower. 
 
The Impact of Inflation on Growth 
 
There is little evidence that moderate inflation has a significantly adverse impact on 
growth. Real growth rates in periods of fairly high inflation have sometimes been 
impressive—and far better than growth rates in seemingly similar countries that have 
brought inflation down. Table  1 examines growth in several countries that have 
experienced episodes of  high inflation  and hyperinflation,  as well as  low and 
moderate inflation. Very high inflation and hyperinflation have been generally 
associated with low growth or open economic recession, although there are exceptions 
to the rule, as in Israel in 1979-1985.  
 
Moderate rates of inflation have been accompanied by rapid economic growth quite 
often, as in Argentina in 1965-1974, Brazil in 1965-1980, Chile in 1986-1996, and 
Poland in 1992-1998. There is agreement across schools of thought that inflation 
beyond a certain  – and possible varying  –  threshold can accelerate into high, 
potentially  hyper, inflation, which is likely to be very detrimental to growth. What 
constitutes price stability, however, is disputed. There is often a range of inflation 
rates where prices are still perceived as stable, reliable, and thus allow sound business 
and consumer decisions, providing the basis for strong revenue growth, reduce real 
debt burdens, and signal demand growth. The view that very low inflation facilitates 
economic growth is not valid as a general proposition. For several of these countries, 
the periods of low inflation have been among those with the slowest rates of economic 




                                                  
1 Country studies on inflation crises and stabilization programs can be found in Bruno et al. (eds.) 




  Years  Low inflation  Moderate inflation  High/hyper inflation 
     Inflation  Growth  Inflation  Growth  Inflation  Growth 
Argentina  1965-1974        30.5  5.1       
  1975-1987              259.4  0.9 
  1988-1990              1912.2  -4.2 
  1991-1993        69.1  10.1     
  1994-2001  0.7  1.4           
   2002-2004        12.2  1.6       
Brazil  1965-1980        36.2  7.9       
  1981-1986              150.4  2.2 
  1987-1995              1187.8  2.0 
   1996-2003  8.5  1.7             
Chile  1965-1971        25.7  4.6       
  1972-1977              269.9  -0.6 
  1978-1985        26.9  3.5     
  1986-1994        18.9  7.4     
   1995-2003  4.8  4.5             
Israel  1965-1970  4.7  8.0             
  1971-1978        30.3  5.5     
  1979-1985              181.5  4.0 
  1986-1996        17.9  5.4     
   1997-2003  3.8  2.2             
Poland  1981-1987        31.2  1.0     
  1988-1991              233.8  -3.7 
  1992-1998        27.2  5.4     
   1999-2003  5.1  3.5             
Turkey  1968-1970  5.4  4.7             
  1971-1977        17.5  6.1     
  1978-1980              71.4  -0.5 
  1981-1987        37.9  5.8     
  1988-2001              72.8  2.8 
   2002-2003        35.1  6.9       
Sources: World Bank WDI/EBRD. Dataset from Bruno, Michael and William Easterly (1998); Inflation 
Crises and Long-run Growth, Journal of Monetary Economics, 41(1), February, pp.3-26. 
  
 
The hard question, of course, is why the experiences of these countries differ so 
markedly. Standard statistical techniques are, in theory, able to show whether inflation 
has been associated with lower growth or more inequality while controlling for all 
other variables. These cross-country regressions,2 although imperfect,3 suggest that 
inflation is not closely related to growth, so long as inflation is not too high – below a 
threshold of around 20 per cent.
4 
                                                  
2 Levine and Renelt, 1992; Levine and Zervos, 1993; Bruno and Easterly, 1996 and 1998; Stanley 
Fischer, 1996. 
3 One of the problems with the simple regression models discussed above is that they seldom account 
fully for important differences in economic structures across countries, as discussed in this section. 
4 Many of the studies show no statistically significant relationship when inflation is below a certain 
threshold. This implies that one can’t reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship below a certain   10 
 
Unexpected or volatile inflation has been more problematic, and interest rate policy 
responses can pose a serious problem in economies where firms have borrowed 
extensively, as was apparent during the Asian crisis. The rise in interest rates led to 
widespread bankruptcies because firms were carrying large levels of short-term debt 
that h ad to be refinanced at extremely high rates. Of course, had there been a history 
of high volatility of interest rates prior to the crisis, firms probably would not  have 
held so much short term leverage in the first place, and the volatility in inflation 
would have had far less impact. If firms come to believe that there will be periodic 
episodes of high interest rates, they will limit their borrowing. But,  as explained 
below, this too can have a significant adverse effect on growth.  
 
Another problem in interpreting data is that shocks to the economic system often lead 
to inflation, but inflation is not necessarily the cause of the problem – it is merely a 
symptom of the external shock. Inflation itself is an endogenous variable that should 
be explained  within the model. For example, the oil price rise in the 1970s led to 
inflation in much of the world; growth slowed and poverty increased. The underlying 
cause of the problem was not the inflation rate, but the higher price of oil. Because 
greater resources were being spent on oil, fewer resources were available for growth. 
The effect that the oil price shock had on countries in Latin America is particularly 
telling. Latin American countries had borrowed heavily to maintain growth during the 
1970s, but the long-run costs of this strategy turned out to be enormous. When the 
United States raised interest rates to extremely high levels many countries defaulted 
on their loans, ushering in the lost decade of the 1980s.5 
 
Policymakers should, of course, undertake policies that mitigate the effects and 
facilitate a broad adjustment to ‘shocks’. When governments respond to inflation by 
tightening macroeconomic policy, while doing little to facilitate the broader 
adjustment, the country is likely to be worse off, especially when the  ‘shock’ has 
already led to an economic slowdown.  
 
Overall, it seems clear that the inflation threshold differs from country to country; but 
in general, we can say that the threshold is significantly higher than the extremely low 
levels advocated in most inflation targeting regimes of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Moderate inflation does not seem particularly bad for growth, and too low inflation 
(aiming at price stability) may actually be bad for growth.  
                                                                                                                                                
level of inflation. Barro (1997) shows that there is no (or only a weak) statistically significant relation 
between economic growth and inflation when inflation is below 20 per cent. Ocampo (2004b) finds that 
threshold to be 40 per cent for Latin America since the mid-1970s. Others show a small but significant 
relationship, i.e. an increase of inflation from 3 to 5 per cent might have a statistical relationship—
statistically different form zero—but so small that so long as inflation does not change much, the 
impact on growth is barely perceptible. 
5 There is an extensive debate about the cause of the lost decade. See Ocampo, forthcoming; Stiglitz 
(2003a) argues that it was not that the import-competing strategy eventually came to a dead end. 
Rather, the problem lay with the totally unexpected and unprecedented high levels of international 
interest rates that followed from the Fed’s policies of the early 1980s.   11 
 
Box 1: The Impact of Inflation on Inequality 
 
The litany against inflation also asserts that ‘inflation is the cruellest tax of all’—that 
it especially hurts the poor. There are some cases where the distributive effects of 
inflation are clearly adverse. For example, hyperinflation in Argentina in the late 
1980s severely hurt the poor, and price stabilization had a positive effect. However, in 
broader terms, the evidence is actually ambiguous as to whom—poor or rich—
inflation hurts more.  The impact of inflation on inequality depends on social and 
market institutions, as well as on the level of indexation in the economy.  
 
Creditors and holders of nominal financial instruments, such as bonds and loans, are 
clearly hurt by unexpected increases in the rate of inflation. The wealthy tend to hold 
financial assets (these assets are less equally distributed than income), so inflation has 
a negative impact on the rich. In most advanced industrial countries, social security is 
indexed, so that poor retirees, who depend on social security, are fully protected. In 
contrast to industrial societies,  social security is limited or non-existent in many 
developing countries. In these countries, inflation can have a greater effect on the 
elderly poor; though stronger family ties and informal networks in developing 
countries can somewhat mitigate the impact. 
 
The effect of inflation on workers depends on whether their wages adjust. In places 
where inflation has been a problem, longer-term contracts often have cost of living 
adjustment clauses. However, in developing countries, many workers are not 
organized. For these countries, as well as for those without an inflationary history, 
indexation is not the norm for a significant proportion of the work force. Here, the 
extent to which inflation impacts workers depends o n whether firms are forced to 
raise wages due to competition in the  labour market,  or  to maintain worker 
productivity as ‘efficiency wage’ theory indicates they should.6 
 
How inflation affects different groups of society is also determined by which sectors 
of the economy it hits. If inflation is strongest in basic food or necessities, it may have 
a larger impact on the urban poor, assuming their incomes do not adjust. On the other 
hand, higher food prices can help agricultural workers and the rural poor. In addition, 
if inflation mostly affects imported luxury items, the impact on the poor will be low. 
 
Overall, though, depending on market institutions, it seems that inflation—so long as 
it  does not  have serious adverse effects on the economy—is worse for bondholders 
than for most other parts of society. This conclusion conforms to the observed 
‘political economy’: financial markets seem most concerned about fighting inflation, 
far more concerned than most other industries, corporations or workers.  
 
 
                                                  
6 If they do not, they will lose workers to firms who have adjusted wages in response to inflation. In 
addition, many firms pay higher wages than is absolutely necessary to attract and retain workers. 
Furthermore, wages have to be high to ensure that workers have enough nutrition to be productive. See 
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984.   12 
The Costs of Fighting Inflation 
 
The benefits of maintaining low inflation have to be offset against the costs. The costs 
of inflation  depend, of course, on how inflation is fought. But whatever the specific 
tools employed, the fight against inflation usually leads to higher unemployment, at 
least in the short run,
7 and the risk of lower growth in the medium term.  
  
One of the arguments against excessive inflation is that it impairs the efficiency of the 
economy, but using tight monetary policy to fight inflation can be equally damaging. 
In Russia, excessively tight money from 1993 to 1998—defended on the grounds that 
it was needed to combat inflation—had extremely adverse effects on efficiency to the 
point that between 60 and 80  per cent of all transactions were conducted  by  barter. 
High interest rates used to fight inflation can also cause widespread bankruptcies, 
especially when an economy is characterized by a significant amount of leverage, as 
was the case in East Asia. 
 
A heavy reliance on monetary policy to stabilize the economy may also lead to 
interest rates being highly variable. Both high and excessively variable interest rates 
make  funds more expensive. In developing countries, equity markets work poorly, 
and most outside financing is in the form of debt. If firms are reluctant to take on debt 
they will have to rely on self-finance, and will find it difficult to meet their working 
capital needs. Thus high and variabl e interest rates impair the efficiency of capital 
markets, further lowering growth rates.  
 
Sometimes governments address one problem, such as inflation, while  exacerbating 
others. One way to check inflation is to allow the currency to appreciate. This reduces 
aggregate demand and domestic price pressures at the same time that imported prices 
in local currencies fall. Even when governments do not deliberately focus on the 
currency, the exchange rate typically strengthens when the government fights 
inflation by raising interest rates. While this may reduce inflation, it can have other 
costs.  The strong currency can hurt exports, the sectors that compete with imports, 
and  employment generation. The resulting trade deficit  may  lead to  an external 
balance problem for the future even worse than the problems that might otherwise 




Like inflation, external balance is an intermediate variable, less important in its own 
right, and more important for its impact on variables that are of greater concern, such 
as stability and growth. It is not always easy to evaluate the links between external 
balance and the more fundamental objectives (just as it’s difficult to evaluate the links 
between inflation and the fundamental objectives). Countries generally try to maintain 
rough external balance—but what this means is not always clear. Some countries, like 
the United States, have maintained large trade deficits over extended periods, and for 
long stretches without apparent problems. The current crisis in US financial markets 
and the possibility of a recession point to  the costs of extreme imbalances. Other, 
                                                  
7 Some argue that in the long run, there is no trade-off. (The Phillips curve is asserted to be vertical.) 
While there is little convincing empirical support for this hypothesis, even if it were true, it does not 
preclude there being a trade-off in the short run.   13 
particularly smaller countries, that have to borrow in foreign currencies,  seem to face 
problems after only short periods of relatively moderate trade deficits. 
 
In the world of fixed exchange rates that prevailed before the early 1970s, a country 
that was buying more from abroad than it was selling had to pay for the gap, either by 
borrowing abroad or selling international reserves. Eventually, a country’s reserves 
would run out, and its creditors would no longer be willing to lend, leading to a crisis. 
 
With flexible exchange rates, the sequence is slightly different, but the outcome is not 
dissimilar.  If the country seems to be borrowing excessively, lenders and other 
investors may suddenly lose confidence in the country and want their money back.  
The exchange rate plunges as investors try to take money out of the country, making it 
even more difficult for those in the country to repay  dollar-denominated short-term 
debt.  
 
Borrowing from abroad has both short-term and long-term consequences, but the 
nature of those consequences depends on what gives rise to the borrowing. If 
countries borrow to finance productive investments that will generate returns in 
excess of the interest rate charged, then growth will be enhanced. Investors will 
recognize the economy’s increased strength and should have more confidence in it. 
But, by borrowing abroad, the country is taking on foreign currency risk, so that a 
devaluation of the local currency will raise the amount of external debt relative to 
domestic GDP. Moreover, short-term investors often look at only  a  part of  the 
country’s balance sheet—the size of fiscal and trade deficits. They often do not look 
at what gives rise to these deficits. So, even when capital inflows are used to finance 
productive investments, they might still cause instability as short-term investors worry 
about the increased deficits. 
 
Frequently, however, capital inflows (especially short-term inflows) go to finance 
increased consumption. Then foreign investors might be justifiably worried about the 
country’s ability to repay its debts. A lack of external balance might then be heralding 
a crisis that will have enormous costs to society. Argentina , for example, experienced 
zero inflation and a strong consumption-led recovery in 1996-1997 fuelled  by capital 
inflows.  GDP growth averaged over 6.7  per cent per year. But the current account 
deficit as a percentage of GDP nearly doubled, and unemployment remained high. 
The recovery was then followed by a four-year recession (1999-2002), during which 
GDP fell 18 per cent and unemployment rose.  
 
To summarize, the short-term benefits of a payments deficit lie in the simple fact that 
demand  –  absorption  – exceeds production, so that firms, the government or 
households consume in excess of their incomes. A payments deficit can be growth-
enhancing if the funds borrowed to finance that demand in excess of income is 
channelled to productive investments. In the medium- to longer-term, however, the 
costs of external imbalances need to be repa id. The stylized picture of external deficits 
suggests that often: (1) capital inflows increase either asset prices or private (luxury) 
consumption, or both, rather than productive investments, and (2) adjustment is 
abrupt, presenting substantial costs in terms of output and employment. It appears that 
even the US, which enjoys the tremendous benefit of not having to borrow in foreign 
currencies, is not immune to such a boom-bust cycle. Policy making needs to be 
aware of the risks of external imbalances.    14 
 
Unemployment and Poverty 
 
Macroeconomic policy should maintain the economy as close to full employment as 
possible.  Economists consider some  (frictional)  unemployment necessary since it 
takes time for workers to move from one job to another, b uts s ignificant 
underutilization of a country’s capacity obviously represents a great waste of 
resources.  As we discuss later, there is  presumed to be  a trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation, the link being that lower unemployment tends to give 
employees bargaining power for higher wages, which in turn are passed on to prices. 
In low employment conditions, inflation is a manifestation of excessive pressure on a 
number of resources, including labour, which can be addressed, e.g. by temporarily 
allowing immigration.  
 
Many economists define full employment as the level of unemployment below which 
inflation would increase. One  problem is that this number (sometimes referred to as 
the NAIRU, the  non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) is  an  elusive 
variable.  In 1993, the conventional wisdom in the U.S. was that the NAIRU was 
around 6.0 to 6.2 per cent. When unemployment fell well below that and inflation did 
not rise, it became clear that the economy was capable of operating at a much lower 
level  of unemployment than the ‘inflation hawks’ had said. There are important 
tradeoffs that policymakers need to consider: lowering unemployment can increase 
inflation, and, perhaps even more importantly, fighting inflation can lead to higher 
unemployment and greater poverty. 
 
Unemployment  and  underemployment are two of the most important sources of 
poverty and inequality; without a job, individuals in most developing countries are 
condemned to a life of poverty and exclusion. Unemployment also weakens workers’ 
bargaining position, thereby lowering wages and further increasing inequity. There 
are, of course, also huge social costs of unemployment. But there are further reasons 
why unemployment may have a particularly strong impact on poverty and inequality. 
First, high unemployment typically hurts the least skilled people the most. There is a 
‘job ladder’, with the most skilled taking jobs from the less skilled in times of a job 
shortage.  That is why the unskilled are most likely to experience bouts of 
unemployment.8 Second, high unemployment pushes down wages, and this increases 
inequality even more.  Third, in many countries, especially developing countries, 
unemployment insurance is non-existent or woefully inadequate, and most workers 
have only a small buffer o f savings.  Hence, after an extended period of 
unemployment, savings are consumed, and individuals generally lose any assets that 
have been collateralized.  
 
It is  clear that two key objectives—maintaining low unemployment and reducing 
poverty—typically complement one another.  By the same token, some policies that 
promote growth also help to reduce poverty. But other policies might promote growth 
without reducing poverty or promote stability without stimulating growth.  There are 
important trade-offs, especially when policymakers focus on intermediate variables. 
In the next section, we look at the main macroeconomic policy tools, the trade-offs 
                                                  
8 Furman and Stiglitz, 1998. 
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III.   FISCAL, MONETARY, AND EXCHANGE RATE 
POLICIES 
 
The three standard  macroeconomic  policy instruments that governments use to 
stabilize the macro-economy are fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. Yet 
there are debates on the efficacy of each of these instruments. F or example, some 
economists argue that fiscal and monetary policies a re ineffective in all countries. 
Others argue that they are important policy tools, though  their effectiveness depends 
on conditions in the economy. In addition  how policies are pursued i s important: 
different instruments have different implications for effectiveness, equity, 
development, and growth. 
 
Discussions of policy instruments are often further confused because governments 
have limited ability to pursue one policy independently of the others. For example, 
under a fixed exchange rate system, the exchange rate chosen by the government 
might not be sustainable, given the chosen fiscal and monetary policies. This is 
especially true with open capital markets, since monetary or fiscal policy choices can 
cause capital to leave or enter the country, putting pressure on the fixed exchange rate.  
 
In the discussion below we look at the effectiveness of each of these policies. We also 
discuss the importance of policy coordination and how this affects  basic policy 




Much of the  fiscal  policy debate has come to focus on the need for developing 
countries to maintain tight fiscal policy. One widespread view is that fiscal deficits 
should be avoided because they ‘crowd out’ private investment, can lead to a loss of 
investor confidence, and are inflationary. Fiscal policy can be an effective tool for 
stimulating an economy facing an economic slowdown.
9 
 
Yet, even those who b elieve in the efficacy of fiscal policy in developed countries 
recognize that developing countries face significant impediments to relying on fiscal 
policy during economic downturns (which is when they should engage in deficit 
spending). Many  governments find it difficult or expensive to borrow the funds 
necessary to finance government spending, while countries that are able to borrow 
risk running up  excessive debt burdens that could be difficult to repay in the future – 




                                                  
9 Note that this section addresses only the cyclical component of fiscal policy, meaning the ways in 
which government can use tools at hand to  counteract a slowdown. The section does not discuss the 
question of the appropriate level of permanent government involvement in the economy, which might 
be of particular relevance for developing countries, i.e. with regard to state-owned enterprises.    16 
Sources of Fiscal Revenues and Policy Constraints 
 
Borrowing Constraints 
One of the main reasons the IMF was founded in 1944 was to help countries in 
depressed conditions finance deficits for economic expansion. The founders 
recognized the interdependence of nations, which means that a downturn in one 
country can have adverse effects on others. They also recognized that capital markets 
are imperfect, and some countries, especially those that are heavily indebted and need 
funds the most, are sometimes unable to borrow at all. The modern theory of capital 
markets, with asymmetric information and costly enforcement, explains why such 
credit rationing can occur.10 When it does, countries are forced to engage in pro-
cyclical fiscal policy: they are forced to cut their deficits during economic slowdowns, 
exacerbating the recession. 
 
Countries that depend on multilateral loans and foreign aid for financing also tend to 
be constrained to follow pro-cyclical policies – even when multilateral lending itself 
is countercyclical. The conditionality generally attached to public sector loans often 
has the same effect of creating pro -cyclical behaviour. Most conditionality includes 
nominal fiscal targets, meaning that  during recessions, when tax revenues fall, 
countries are forced to cut expenditures to meet their targets. The pro -cyclicality due 
to conditionality is compounded by the pro-cyclical nature of aid. 
 
Aid Delivery and Absorption 11 
Since the Millennium Declaration was agreed upon by the UN General Assembly in 
2000 and the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002, efforts 
have again  been underway to muster support to increase development assistance to 
0.7  per cent of developed country national income. In addition, the change in aid 
modalities has moved towards more direct budget support, often meaning that 
headline “aid” figures, in fact, involve debt relief.  
 
The new environment poses challenges for both aid donors and recipients.  Most 
people would naturally expect that an increase in aid would lead to an increase in 
spending. What few realize is that this is only one half of the equation—aid really 
only benefits the recipient economy when it is absorbed.  In the best of times, 
coordination is needed between officials in the Ministry of  Finance and the Central 
Bank. With budgetary support, this cooperation is of paramount importance.  
 
Aid financing is like other foreign inflows: it impacts exchange rates, interest rates, 
and domestic prices, as we discuss later in this note.  The injections of liquidity, 
through the conversion of donor flows into domestic currency, can cause gyrations in 
interest and exchange rates, especially when flows are volatile. Donor flows may 
produce exchange-rate appreciation and, if sustained over a length of time, could lead 
to the kind of overvaluation phenomenon known as ‘Dutch disease’, which we discuss 
later, following the section on exchange rate policies. 
 
Predictability of aid flows over time is a precondition for their effective use. But aid 
flows, l ike o ther capital flows, tend to rise and fall with economic cycles in donor 
                                                  
10 Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; and Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981. 
11 This section is taken from Schneider (2006).   17 
countries and policy assessments of the recipient countries, as well as shifts in donor 
policies.  This volatility is exacerbated by the gap between commitments and 
disbursements. Empirical work suggests that the volatility of aid flows exceeds that of 
other macroeconomic variables, such as GDP or fiscal revenue. Moreover, donors 
tend to move in and out together, causing herding behaviour. The PRSP, PRGF and 
CPIA function like a rating signal for donors, and they react in a similar fashion to 
signals by Bretton Wood institutions – in many ways , similar to the reactions of 
private creditors. When aid falls; it leads to costly fiscal adjustments in the form of 
increased taxation and spending cuts that reinforce the cyclical impact of declining aid 
flows. Similar to other capital flows, the volatility of aid flows also affects the balance 
sheets of the banking system and credit availability. We’ll discuss these issues and 
policy measures that countries can utilize to deal with volatile capital inflows later in 
this note. 
 
A policy response is also  needed at the international level to stretch-out the period of 
the inflow in line with an underlying long-term development strategy. Donors should 
make commitments of assistance early in the budget cycle of the recipient, so that 
countries know how much they can reasonably expect and plan. Commitments should 
be for the medium-term or longer, even if the outer years can only be indicative due to 
budgetary restrictions in donor countries. This will allow the central bank to manage 
the liquidity of donor flows to avoid sudden shocks due to erratic disbursements, and 
allow the Ministry of Finance to raise resources to meet short-falls.  
 
Policymakers need to look at the longer term as well, and answer some hard questions 
as they make decisions. If one expands public sector investment now, using aid, will 
the government be able to maintain that level of spending in the future, when the aid 
flows begin to slow? If not, is the initial spending wasted? Countries need to d esign 
policies to reduce aid dependency by maintaining and increasing domestic revenues in 
a sustainable fashion.  
 
In summary, aid flows can be an important source of government funds. Donor and 
recipient countries in cooperation with multilateral institutions need to ensure that: (1) 
promised flows are delivered, (2) flows represent actual resources rather than debt 
relief, (3) aid is provided in a stable, reliable fashion so that (4) recipient countries can 
plan accordingly and manage the potential pitfalls of “Dutch disease.” 
 
Public Resource Mobilization 
The most effective way to fund government spending and reduce aid dependency is to 
mobilize domestic resources. The low levels of tax collection in many poor countries 
limits important government expenditures and forces countries to borrow or depend 
on aid flows to finance basic development needs. Given the volatility of external 
financing and the important role that public sector investment c an play in long-term 
development, it is critical for governments to be able to raise domestic revenues. Only 
with increased tax revenues will countries be able to sustain long-term domestic 
investments and fiscal policy flexibility.
12  
 
                                                  
12 Low levels of domestic resource collection limit the government’s ability to use fiscal policy – the 
government can’t afford to lower tax rates during a recession and is unable to raise them during a 
boom .   18 
Poor countries, on average, collect only around about two-thirds of the tax revenues 
as a percentage of GDP collected by richer countries.
13 Even some of the wealthier 
emerging market countries, such as India, still have relatively low tax revenue to 
GDP. In most developing countries direct taxes, such as income taxes, contribute only 
a small percentage of total tax revenues. For example, tax collection on income, 
profits, and capital gains in Latin America and Asia is  one-third to  one-half  of 
collection levels in OECD countries.
14  
 
Most developing countries rely on indirect taxes for revenue. Many of the reforms of 
the 1990s and 2000s, which pushed an agenda of liberalization, shifted taxation to 
VAT from other indirect taxes, such as tariffs and other trade taxes. VAT is a tax  on 
consumption, rather than investment, and many orthodox economists supported the 
shift to VAT because they believed it would distort incentives to invest less than other 
types of taxes. As such, VAT reform is in line with pro-business liberalization efforts. 
VAT, however,  is  also  a tax on  the formal sector, and therefore not as effective in 
countries with large informal sectors, where it operates like a tax on sales rather than a 
tax on value added. In fact, VAT can encourage firms to stay in the informal sector to 
avoid taxation, hindering the development of the formal sector.15 VAT is a highly 
regressive tax, meaning that the poor pay more as a share of income than the wealthy. 
For the same reasons, lower income classes with higher spending propensities are 
taxed average rates. Multiple rates (such as higher taxes on luxury goods and lower or 
zero taxes on food and medicine) can be used to make VAT less regressive, though 
this requires additional administrative capacity.  
 
Overall, the net result of the shift to VAT has been a reduction in revenues. In a 2005 
study by the IMF
16 found that VAT replaced less than 30 per cent of the revenues lost 
through the elimination of trade taxes. Revenues from VAT have often been lower 
than expected due to difficulties in administration and collection. 
 
Rather than relying on one indirect tax, such as VAT, countries should try to diversify 
sources of tax revenues in a simple and transparent manner. Reducing exemptions and 
deductions that benefit the wealthy, such as exemptions from capital gains taxes or 
low taxes on financial income, would of course help to increase collection. Many 
economists have argued against capital gains taxes because they tax sources of 
investment, but in many developing countries, declaring income in the form of capital 
gains or dividends is a way to avoid other forms of direct taxation. In a second best 
world where income tax collection is difficult, taxing these sources of revenue can be 
an effective means o f reducing evasion. Furthermore, there  does not appear to be a 
clear link between direct taxation and growth rates. FitzGerald found that growth in 
Latin America is largely independent of tax rates; and even in OECD countries the 
relationship between growth and direct taxation is small and the causality unclear.
17 
 
Although the WTO has limited the ability to use trade taxes, there is still some scope 
within the WTO for some use of trade taxes as well. For example, taxes can target 
luxury items that are imported; or a system of variable tariffs on agricultural and 
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15 Emran and Stiglitz, 2005. 
16 Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005. 
17 FitzGerald, 2006.   19 
industrial goods can operate in a band within the WTO tariff bindings. (These and 
other trade-related taxes are discussed in the Trade Policy  Note in more detail.) 
Countries can also impose export duties to capture some of the gains from 
devaluation. Argentina, for example, imposed export duties that generated revenues of 
almost 2.5 per cent of GDP following the devaluation of the peso in 2001.
18 
 
To reduce evasion, countries can also try to design more  ‘corruption-resistant tax 
structures’ that rely on non-discretionary and readily observable tax instruments. One 
such measure is a tax on financial transaction. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
India, and Korea imposed this type of a tax on bank debits. In Brazil, for example, the 
financial transaction tax collects around 1.5 per cent of GDP19. These taxes have the 
added benefit of providing information about firm transactions that can help 
authorities increase collection and find evading firms. Korea has also implemented a 
similar program  to reduce the attractiveness of cash by offering a subsidy for credit 
cards. The goal is to shift transactions from cash to a medium  that is traceable.
20 
These types of taxes generally carry the risk that they might encourage firms to 
operate outside the formal banking sector, but in countries where banking services are 
relatively well developed, these taxes have proved  to be effective. Furthermore, they 
play a countercyclical role by slowing financial transactions during financial booms 
and bubbles.  
 
Other examples of non-discretionary  ‘corruption-resistant taxes’ include taxes that 
target consumption items, such as luxury cars or homes.  Within these categories, 
collection agencies should focus on what’s observable. So, for example, taxing 
property sales might be more effective than taxing property values. Taxes on luxury 
items would, again, serve to enhance countercyclical policymaking during boom 
periods. 
 
Improving tax administration is also important for increasing collection. Tanzania’s 
tax reform, for example, raised tax revenues by 47 per cent from 1998 through 2003.21 
The Province of Buenos Aires’ administrative reforms succeeded in increasing 
collection of direct taxes, such as car license fees (from 50 per cent to 90 per cent), 
real estate taxes (from 40 per cent to 70 per cent), and company income taxes. Other 
recommendations for improving tax collection and reducing corruption include 
improving information available to tax officials, sharing information between 
different departments (such as income, VAT, customs duties, etc.), and improving 
property cadastres and financial asset registries.  
 
As mentioned above, income taxes have generally not collected significant amounts 
of tax revenue in most developing countries. Given the reliance on indirect taxation, 
and the low level of direct taxation, collection of indirect taxes in developing 
countries is now comparable to collection levels in developed countries. Some 
economists argue that to significantly increase taxes further countries might now need 
to improve direct tax collection.22 This would have the added benefit of increasing the 
progressiveness of tax collection in developing countries. In many developing 
                                                  
18 Centrangolo: IPD Argentina tax case study, forthcoming. 
19 Oliveira: IPD Brazil tax case study, forthcoming. 
20 Jun: IPD Korea tax case study, forthcoming. 
21 Culpeper and Kappagoda, 2006. 
22 FitzGerald, 2006.   20 
countries, income taxes are currently not progressive in practice because the wealthy 
are able to take advantage of loopholes and other forms of tax evasion.
23 An increase 
in income tax collection could start by focusing on reducing these exemptions. 
 
One argument often used against increasing direct taxation is that countries lack the 
administrative capacity to do so. Yet, before VAT taxes were instituted across 
developing countries, much of the policy debate was on whether developing countries 
would have the administrative capacity to implement VAT as well. To help countries 
build capacity the international financial institutions mounted a successful campaign 
that provided technical assistance. Fitzgerald has argued that similar international 
assistance to improve capacity  for direct taxation could be equally effective.24 But in 
the absence of such an effort, the example of the Province of Buenos Aires shows that 
local policymakers can take steps to improve administration effectively. 
 
                                                  
23 Birdsall and Torre, 2001. 
24 FitzGerald, 2006.   21 
 
Box 2: Taxation of Multinational Corporations 
 
Some of the biggest loopholes in developing countries are for large multinational 
corporations. Tax competition between countries to attract investment has eroded the 
taxation of foreign companies. Many developing countries have used tax holidays to 
attract foreign investment. But instead of having positive long-term effects on 
economic growth, tax holidays have often led to competition  among  countries, 
bringing revenue for all countries down in a race to the bottom. Furthermore, tax 
holidays give foreign investors an unfair advantage relative to domestic investors, and 
can lead to domestic firms demanding equivalent tax relief, reducing revenue 
collection further. Tax holidays also exempt all of a company’s profits, irrespective of 
the profitability of the investment. When profits are high, investors would most likely 
have invested, whether or not there was a tax holiday being offered. On the other 
hand, companies that need tax holidays to ensure profitability often shift to another 
location once the holiday is over.  
 
A second difficulty in tax collection on multinational  corporations results from 
international tax havens. International tax havens allow multinationals to shift 
corporate profits to other jurisdictions.  Tax havens have made it difficult to close 
many of the tax loopholes without a coordinated international action, but  it is 
important for policymakers to be aware of the impact on tax revenues. FitzGerald has 
estimated that, after taking into account underreporting, the effective tax rate on 
foreign investment in developing countries is only around 4  per cent (much lower 
than the 25 per cent officially reported.) Tax havens have made it difficult to close 
many of the tax loopholes without a coordinated international action, but it’s 
important for policymakers to be aware of the impact on tax revenues. One estimate
25 
is that tax losses to developing countries, due to shifting profits and assets held 
abroad, are as high as $100 billion annually. 
 
 
Another important component to domestic resource mobilization is the extent of 
domestic savings and the development of local capital markets. With greater domestic 
savings, governments wouldn’t need to rely on foreign inflows. One of the reasons 
that the East Asian countries were able to grow as quickly as they did in the 1980s 
and 1990s was because they had a deep pool of domestic savings. Interestingly, in 
some Asian countries government policy was instrumental in stimulating the growth 
of domestic savings. In Japan, for example, the government helped develop a postal 
savings bank network that gave citizens access to financial services and helped build 
the domestic savings base. The lack of sound financial institutions and financial 
services can make it difficult to mobilize savings. As the Asian example shows 
government policy can help reduce this obstacle. 
 
More broadly, countries should aim to build deeper financial markets. One of the 
main risks to governments of financing their deficits through domestic capital markets 
is that it’s often difficult for them to issue long-term paper in relatively new and thin 
markets. Governments thus face a trade-off between reducing currency risk (by 
reducing borrowing in international markets) and increasing the maturity mismatch 
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(by increasing short-term borrowing in domestic markets to finance long-term 
projects).  
 
Developing long-term capital markets is, of course, a long term goal, but there are 
things governments can do to encourage their development. Many analysts point to 
the importance of regular and predictable auctions, standard instruments, a secondary 
market, a safe banking sector, and macroeconomic stability.  The lessons of Latin 
America and Asia in the 1990s and early 2000s have also shown that one of the most 
important steps in building domestic capital markets has been the development of 
local pension funds. Chile was a pioneer in this area, and in several other countries, 
such as Mexico, the growth of local pension funds has stimulated demand for long 
term lending, as we’ll discuss later in this note under public-sector liability 
management. 
 
The Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy 
 
We now turn our focus to the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Assuming countries can 
borrow: is fiscal policy generally effective – or should it be avoided because it adds to 
inflationary pressures and crowds out private investment? Later in this note we’ll 
discuss low-cost stimuli and other fiscal measures that countries with limited ability to 
borrow can use to stimulate the economy. 
  
In Keynesian analysis, government expenditures (or tax cuts) lead to an increase in 
GDP that’s a  multiple26 of the or iginal expenditure. Most of the money paid by the 
government is re-spent, and the more that’s re-spent, the greater the multiplier.  If 
savings rates are low, as they often are in very poor countries, then the proportion of 
funds going into consumption will be high, the multiplier will be very large, and 
public expenditures will be particularly effective. By contrast, in East Asia, where 
savings rates have been very high, multipliers have been somewhat smaller.  
 
When households and firms are credit and cash constrained (as there often are in 
developing countries), the multiplier can be even stronger: if those households and 
firms had more money they would spend it. For example, if the government provides 
better unemployment benefits, it’s likely that the unemployed will spend all or almost 
all of the benefit. When they spend the money, some of it will go to individuals 
(landlords, storeowners, etc.) who will not spend all of it, but the important point is 
that in developing countries the multiplier can be quite high.  
 
It’s important to differentiate between the effects of deficits when the economy is in 
recession and when the economy is at full employment; the latter case is when deficits 
are more likely to have an adverse effect. Crowding-out (and inflationary) arguments 
are then persuasive because the size of the  ‘pie’ is fixed. When the economy is 
operating at capacity, increased government expenditures must come at the expense of 
reduced consumption or reduced investment somewhere else in the economy, and 
such policies can be beneficial if the government pursues redistribution or attempts to 
foster socially desirable investments.  On the other hand,  crowding out is  not 
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inevitable when the economy is  below  full employment. The size of the pie can 
increase so  that government expenditures can rise without private investment 
decreasing. Or, in the case of tax cuts, consumption can increase, without investment 
decreasing. 
 
Private investment  is crowded-out by government spending through interest rates. 
Either an increase in demand for goods and services leads to higher interest rates – 
essentially  via central bank reaction  – or the increase in government demand for 
loanable funds pushes up the interest rate. Thus, the crowding-out argument implicitly 
assumes that Central Banks cannot take offsetting actions to lower interest rates. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence on these theoretical links between government 
spending and interest rates (and their effect on investment) is, at best, tenuous.  
 
Another concern about government borrowing is that debt will be monetized, meaning 
borrowing will be financed by, in effect, printing money, triggering  inflation.
27 Even 
when interest rates are close to zero and there are limits on the ability of monetary 
authorities to lower interest rates further (a Keynesian-type liquidity trap28), central 
banks can at least undo the higher interest rates resulting from government deficits. 
Moreover, in a small open economy, there i s another reason why interest rates might 
not rise and there won’t be crowding out:  an inflow of capital can prevent a rise in 
interest rates, as we will discuss below.  
 
Finally, private sector responses may actually have the opposite effect – and enhance 
the effects of fiscal policy. There may be  ‘crowding in’. For i nstance, higher 
government expenditures might stimulate the economy and improve the economic 
situation so much that there’s room for more investment. Similarly, an increase in 
government investments that complements private investment (for example, spending 
on infrastructure) can increase returns in the private sector and stimulate private 
investment and the economy as a whole.  
 
The success of China’s expenditures during the East Asian crisis provides a case in 
point. Part of the reason for China’s success was that current expenditures drew upon 
a set of strategic investment plans that focused on improving infrastructure. The 
improved infrastructure increased the returns to private investments. This, in turn, 
encouraged productive investments that stimulated China’s long-term growth. India’s 
experience with stabilization and adjustment, following its external debt crisis during 
the early 1990s, was somewhat different. Yet, it also provides clear evidence of 
complementarities between public investment and private investment, which suggests 
crowding-in rather than crowding-out.
29  
                 
An additional reason why some economists also argue that governments need to 
maintain tight fiscal policy is to maintain investor confidence. According to this view, 
                                                  
27 There are some models in which inflation can set in even when the economy has not reached full 
employment. Typically, this is because of structural rigidities; to the extent that these are important, full 
employment needs to be redefined to include them, and government policy needs to be directed at 
removing the structural rigidities. 
28 In a liquidity trap, the public holds onto money supplied to the economy rather than investing or 
spending. A liquidity trap could occur when the economy is in recession and interest rates are low, so 
that the expected return on investments are also low. If the recession is accompanied by deflation, there 
is an added incentive for consumers to hold spending on consumption. 
29 Nayyar, 2000.   24 
government spending leads to lower private investment because investors see the 
rising deficits, lose confidence in the economy, and decide not to invest. Only resolute 
government action to counter the deficit can restore confidence, increase investment, 
and quickly restore the economy to health.  
 
However, t here is little empirical research supporting this view, while there is 
overwhelming evidence that cutting government expenditures leads to lower GDP in 
both developed and developing
30 countries. Expenditure reductions in Argentina and 
East Asia in the 1990s did not have the positive effects predicted by the ‘confidence 
model’, but instead produced the negative effects predicted by the more standard 
Keynesian models. The direct effect of a cut in government expenditure on GDP 
appears to be much stronger than the confidence effect. 
 
The impact of tight fiscal policy on investor confidence depends in a large part on the 
type of investors a government hopes to attract. Short-term investors and creditors are 
often more interested in the size of the fiscal deficit than in other variables. The most 
important issue for these investors is government’s ability to repay its debt in the near 
term. To the extent that government saves money by cutting the fiscal deficit, it will 
have more funds to pay back creditors in the short run—even if this hampers long-
term growth. But these are precisely the type of investors who heighten market 
volatility, rather than sustaining long-term growth.  
 
Long-term investors look beyond the deficit to a range of variables. Policies that lead 
to long term sustainable growth will naturally lead to greater confidence in the 
economy and more investment. If countries borrow to finance productive investments 
that will generate returns in excess  of the interest rate charges, then growth will be 
enhanced. Investors will recognize the economy’s increased strength and should have 
more confidence in it.  
 
The Pro-cyclical Bias of Fiscal Policy 
Tax revenues rise during periods of economic growth when i ncomes rise, and fall 
during recessions when incomes fall and spending needs rise. Theoretically, external 
financing should diversify sources of income, but imperfections in capital markets and 
cycles of foreign aid have meant that capital flows have tended to be pro-cyclical, 
exacerbating the pro -cyclical bias of fiscal accounts.  
 
There is widespread evidence that fiscal accounts are highly  pro-cycl ical in the 
developing world. 31 In Latin America, for example, out of 45 episodes of cyclical 
swings in 1990-2001, 12 were neutral, 25 were  pro-cyclical, and only 8 
countercyclical.
32 So, the broader problem faced by developing countries are the 
strong incentives for fiscal policies to behave in a  pro-cyclical way. This effect is 
compounded by the pro-cyclical performance of public sector revenues in the context 
of high GDP volatility.  
 
The costs of  pro-cyclical fiscal policies are high. During upswings, abundant 
financing may lead authorities to start some projects that have low social returns. 
During downswings, cuts in spending may mean that investment projects are left 
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unfinished or take much longer to execute than planned, thereby raising their effective 
cost. In turn, extended cuts in public sector investment may have long-term effects on 
growth.33 In general,  ‘stop-go’ cycles significantly reduce the efficiency of public 
sector spending. 
 
There are also pro-cyclical patterns associated with granting government guarantees 
to the private sector, which have become increasingly important in the developing 
world. An example is public-sector guarantees for private-sector investments in 
infrastructure (such as minimum revenue or profit guarantees, or explicit coverage of 
interest or exchange rate risks). Another example is explicit and implicit guarantees 
issued to financial agents and depositors in the financial system. Both implicit and 
explicit guarantees have three elements in common: (a) they are not always 
transparent; (b) they encourage  private spending during booms (public-sector 
spending is in the form of an i mplicit ‘insurance premium’ incurred during periods of 
euphoria, indicating that accrued public-sector spending during  such  periods is 
underestimated); and (c) disbursements (cash spending) are incurred during crises, 
increasing borrowing requirements and crowding out other public-sector spending. 
 
Alternative Fiscal Policy Measures 
 
Fiscal Policy Accounting: Structural and Primary Deficits 
A primary aim of economic policy in developing countries should be to avoid the pro -
cyclical bias in fiscal policy. This can be consistent with the establishment of rules 
that guarantee long-term sustainability of the fiscal account, such as targets for the 
public sector deficit and/or maximum debt-to-GDP ratios. (The definition of such 
rules is not an easy task, however, as demonstrated by the recent debates over the 
European Stability and Growth Pact.)  
 
In particular, a focus on the current fiscal deficit (measured during the recession) is 
clearly inappropriate. Rather, it’s essential to estimate  ‘the structural deficit’, which 
evaluates what the budget would be without cyclical fluctuations34 in a ‘normal’ (full 
employment) situation. For example, when tax revenues fall during a recession, the 
current fiscal deficit will worsen, but the structural full employment deficit will not be 
affected, and the government will not be forced to tighten fiscal policy further to meet 
its deficit target.  If necessary, the  institutions  could play a role in financing any 
current  fiscal  deficit that arises.  To the extent that cyclical swings reduce the 
efficiency of public sector spending, it may make sense to determine structural targets 
on the basis of an essentially long-term criterion: the balanced supply of public and 
private goods. 
 
Managing structural accounts, however, assumes considerable fiscal capacity beyond 
what most least developed countries have established, so that this tool is more 
appropriate for middle income countries.  Estimating structural fiscal positions in 
economies subject to external shocks is not an easy task as it may involve long-term 
GDP trends as well as trends of other crucial economic variables, such as commodity 
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34 For countries that were neutral, the structural fiscal deficit remained unchanged through the 
improvement or deterioration of fiscal accounts. See ECLAC, 1998b; Ocampo, 2002, and 2005b, on 
which the analysis that follows relies. 
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prices. Chile, for example, has adopted such structural accounting in recent years, 
relying on the evaluation of a panel of economists with mixed persuasions to advise 
on the trends of the crucial variables involved in the estimation.  
 
It also makes sense for developing countries to focus on the primary deficit, the fiscal 
deficit minus interest payments. Interest rates can be extremely volatile and are often 
outside the control of developing countries. What is more, public debt that has 
accumulated over a long period of time means that a large fiscal deficit will persist for 
quite some time after correctives have been introduced. In highly indebted countries, 
much of the variability of the overall fiscal position depends on events outside the 
country (on emerging market interest rates around the globe). Countries need to focus 
on what they can control. The primary deficit shows more clearly whether an 
observed change makes the situation better or worse. The IMF agreed to focus on the 
primary deficit for the first time in its loan to Brazil in 2002.
35 A focus on the primary 
deficit does not require extensive administrative capacity, so that least developed 
countries should also be able to use the primary deficit as a measure of the fiscal 
accounts  – assuming the international institutions help to finance the additional 
interest costs implicit in the full fiscal deficit. 
 
Management of Public-private Partnerships 
Deficit targets discussed above should be complemented by adequate mechanisms to 
manage public-sector guarantees. Deficit targets create a strong incentive for 
governments to promote private (rather than public) sector investment in 
infrastructure to circumvent the targets, even when there is no economic reason to do 
so. A major problem in relation to these guarantees is that they generate significant 
distortions in public sector accounting. The contingency costs of such projects for the 
state are not usually accounted for, and do not show up in current expenditures. Such 
guarantees imply that the government acts as an insurer of risks that the private 
investor might incur. The ‘insurance premium equivalent’ of such guarantees should 
be regularly estimated and budgeted, with the corresponding resources transferred to 
special funds created to serve as a backup in the event that the corresponding 
contingencies become effective. The estimated contingent liabilities should also be 
added to the public sector debt. A 1996 Colombian law forces the government agency 
incurring the risk to make a provision in an ‘insurance’ fund whose resources can be 
used if guarantees become effective. 
 
The absence of any regular accounting of government guarantees for private sector 
infrastructure projects generates an incentive to prefer such infrastructure projects, 
even if they are not less costly to the government in the long run. Such public sector 
guaranteed private infrastructure investments might become a useful way to 
circumvent stringent fiscal deficit targets. The nature of fiscal targets should be 
chosen to avoid these problems. 
 
There is a similar issue in accounting for state-owned enterprises, which we discuss in 
more detail later in this note. These accounting practices distort the incentives 
authorities face. Accounting for state-owned companies as part of the consolidated 
budget constrains expenditures on investments and gives developing countries the 
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incentive to privatize these companies to reduce the fiscal d eficit, even when there is 
no real economic reason to do so.  
 
Automatic Stabilizers: Fiscal Stabilization Funds 
Due to the inevitable time lags in the decision making process, automatic stabilizers 
may sometimes be preferable to discretionary changes. Progressive taxation, which 
reduces the impact of taxation on the poor during a recession can be less destabilizing 
than other forms of taxation. (The shift toward V.A.T., has moved countries  away 
from progressive taxation, which may lead to the tax system be ing a less effective 
automatic stabilizer.) Well-designed social safety nets that protect vulnerable groups 
during crises,  preferably as part of permanent social protection systems,  and fiscal 
stabilization funds are other important instruments in this reg ard. 
 
Fiscal stabilization funds, which sterilize temporary public-sector revenues, should be 
a central tool for countercyclical policy. The experience gained from the management 
of stabilization funds for commodities that have a significant fiscal impact  (the 
National Coffee Fund of Colombia, the copper and petroleum funds in Chile and the 
oil funds in several countries)36 can be extended to develop broader fiscal stabilization 
funds.
37  A similar example is foreign exchange reserves, which provide  ‘self-
insurance’ against sudden interruptions in external financing (as well as reduced 
currency appreciation). 
 
The point of a stabilization fund is to put funds aside when the economy is booming, 
to be used when the economy is in recession. However, economists disagree on when 
a country should be building funds and when it should be spending them. For 
example, in 2005, the province of Mendoza in Argentina was growing at or above the 
national average and running a fiscal surplus. Many economists recommended that 
Mendoza save the surplus above current expenditures in an anti-cyclical stabilization 
fund. However, the governor of Mendoza pointed out that unemployment at the time, 
while lower than elsewhere in Argentina, was still high, at between seven and eight 
per cent. In his view, it made more sense to invest the surplus in employment 
generating activities, since the economy was still  significantly  below full 
employment. 
 
There are two criteria that can help determine when the surplus should be spent, rather 
than saved. The first is based on expectations about the future. If the economy is 
growing today and a slowdown is expected, it would make sense to save a significant 
portion of the surplus. Employment would be lower today, but resources would be 
available to support more employment generation tomorrow when the economy slows 
down. The second  is based on the expected returns of each project. Is government 
spending going into investment and job creation or consumption? To the extent that 
funds go into consumption, they are unlikely to lead to future growth, and it would be 
wiser to put the surplus into a fund. To the extent that funds go into investment, the 
returns could be high for both current employment and future growth, due to the 
multiplier and crowding-in effects discussed earlier. 
 
                                                  
36 See an evaluation of some of these experiences in Davis et al., 2003. 
37 ECLAC, 1998b. 
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The major policy implication of the previous analysis is, however, that  international 
financial institutions  should help countries build stabilization funds that can be used 
as counter-cyclical tools. 
 
Counter-cyclical Tax Policies, Low-Cost Stimuli and Other Fiscal Policy Alternatives 
To the extent that stabilization funds sterilize the additional revenues generated by a 
commodity or capital boom, they make fiscal policy  cycle -neutral at most, as the 
additional revenues due to increased demand go into reserves. A complementary 
instrument, of clear counter-cyclical character, would be to design flexible tax rates, 
particularly to manage sharp private sector spending cycles. The best candidate is 
obviously a tax on the source of the spending boom. This is the traditional argument 
for taxing exports subject to temporary price surges, which has served as the basis for 
the design of commodity stabilization funds.  
 
A similar argument can be used to justify an increase in the tax on capital  inflows 
during booms, as this is the major source of private-sector spending upswings today.  
It is interesting to note that this argument is in addition to the arguments associated 
with the greater monetary autonomy that a tax on capital flows provides, which will 
be discussed. An argument can also be made for temporary hikes of VAT rates during 
private spending booms and reductions of VAT rates during downswings.
38 
 
Countries unable to borrow to finance a tax reduction during a  downturn still  have 
some fiscal policy tools that can be used to stimulate the economy. Two such policy 
tools are  ‘expenditure and tax shifting’ and ‘low cost stimuli’. ‘Expenditure and tax 
shifting’ increases taxes on those who are less likely to reduce expenditures, and cuts 
taxes on those more likely to increase expenditures, thereby stimulating the economy. 
Increasing the progressivity of taxation (as discussed under automatic stabilizers) does 
precisely this. As noted, giving a tax cut to low income individuals is likely to 
stimulate the economy more per dollar of tax cut simply because poorer people are 
more credit and cash constrained. Spending more money on goods produced at home 
and less on goods from abroad will similarly help stimulate the economy.  
 
Countries facing limitations on borrowing need to focus on policies that have a bigger 
impact for a limited amount of expenditure, called low cost stimuli. For example, a 
temporary sales tax cut can have a far larger effect than a temporary income tax cut. 
The importance of cash flows and credit constraints suggests some other examples of 
low cost stimuli. As discussed above, increasing unemployment benefits for low-
income workers  has been  particularly effective because virtually all such workers are 
credit  –  and cash  –  constrained. (In many countries an increase in aid to regional 
governments and localities during recessions is also more likely to have a bigger 
stimulus effect, since sub-national governments are often subject to balanced budget 
fiscal frameworks, or have more limited access to financing and have to cut 
expenditures or increase taxes without such aid.) 
 
Public investment expenditures may have a double effect. First, there is the immediate 
stimulation to the economy. Second, if the public investments are complementary to 
private investments, as discussed above, increasing government spending will 
increase the returns to private investment, fuelling additional investment. 
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Other low -cost stimuli focus on firms. The prototypical low -cost stimulus is the 
‘incremental  investment tax credit’. An incremental investment tax credit provides a 
tax credit on increases in investments (e.g., the tax credit might apply to investments 
over 80  per cent of the previous year’s investment). The incremental investment tax 
credit lowers the marginal cost of investment; just as an ordinary investment tax credit 
would (the government, in effect, picks up a fraction of the cost of the machine or 
other investment). At least in standard models, it has the same stimulative effect of a 
full investment tax credit, but the cost to the government is markedly less because the 
credit  does not apply to the bulk (or the ‘base’) of an investment. (This, incidentally, 
is why U.S. businesses have been distinctly uninterested in this kind of tax credit.) 
 
A temporary incremental investment tax cut can be even more effective in providing 
short-run stimulus to the economy. A temporary investment tax credit lowers the price 
of investing today relative to investing in the future. This is like a temporary ‘sale’ on 
investment goods, and will encourage current investment (although partly at the 
expense of future investment). However, if markets are imperfect and firms’ available 
cash (or net worth) limits their investment, the incremental investment tax credit 
(whether permanent or temporary) will not be as effective. When fewer funds are 
available, investment is stimulated less.
39 
 
Another low-cost stimulus is carry-forward or carry-back tax treatment. The 
government can extend the period of loss carry-forward (when  tax deductions are not 
taken in the current year, but are used to reduce tax liabilities in future years) or carry -
back (when deductions are used to reduce tax liabilities in earlier years). This has the 
positive effect of increasing economic efficiency
40 a nd makes the losses fully 
creditable , to the extent that firms engage in investment. These policies might boost 
investment for yet another reason: in effect, they increase the extent of government 
risk -sharing.  Since the ability and willingness of firms to bear risk limits their 
willingness to invest, better risk sharing between government and firms enhances 
investment. The government can also provide direct credit to firms for investment 
(though obviously, it is important that this be well designed, so tha t the government is 
able to recover principal and interest.)  
 
In short, developing countries often have difficulties borrowing, which can impair 
their ability to engage in fiscal policy. But there are alternative fiscal policy tools, 
including tax structure, stabilization fund (insurance) policies, and new instruments 
that can minimize the  pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy and give the government 
some means to engage in countercyclical policy. 
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Monetary Policy 
 
Economists have long debated whether fiscal or monetary policy instruments offer the 
more suitable tools to conduct countercyclical policies. Keynes famously argued that 
monetary policy can be like “pushing on a string,” and therefore, as discussed in 
previous sections, fiscal policy plays a crucial role in demand management.  
 
Over the past three decades, conservative economists have argued that fiscal policy – 
due to the presumably negative impact of budget deficits – should be restrained, and 
monetary policy conducted by central banks has to be  of primary importance. While a 
measured policy approach and informed use of a variety of tools appear to be most 
beneficial, the debate on monetary policy focuses on its effectiveness.  
 
The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy 
 
Recent experiences confirm both the strengths and limitations of monetary policy. In 
general, economists view monetary policy as more effective in restraining an 
overheated economy than in expanding an economy in deep recession. Monetary 
policy, for example, has not been effective in s timulating growth in countries 
experiencing deflation (such as Japan)
41. In the United States, lowering interest rates 
from 2001 to 2003 did little to stimulate investment, but did induce the financial 
sector and  households to  increase their debt burdens.42  The reduced mortgage 
payments and the improved financial position of households enabled consumers to 
sustain their spending even as their stock market wealth diminished enormously.  
 
The impact of monetary policy in developing countries is likely to differ from the 
impact in the United States and other advanced industrial countries. Monetary policy 
has its most direct impact through the banking system.  In countries with more 
developed banking sectors the effects of monetary policy can be more significant in 
developing countries than in developed countries since firms have less access to non-
bank sources of finance and tend to rely more on bank lending.  In many least 
developed  countries,  though, the banking sector is extremely undeveloped, and  most 
firms rely on self-finance. In these circumstances, the impact of monetary policy on 
the economy is limited. The narrower the impact of monetary policy, the greater the 
costs associated with using it, since a few sectors are forced to bear the brunt of 
adjustment. Those sectors may face greater volatility, as interest rates rise and fall in 
an attempt to stabilize the economy.  
 
Under conventional closed economy analysis, lowering interest rates leads to 
increased investment and higher growth. Recent research points to additional channels 
through which changes in interest rates either reinforce or counteract the conventional 
effects. First, there are several channels through which  lowering interest rates may 
stimulate consumption further than the conventional analysis implies. Changes in the 
interest rate represent a redistribution of income  between  creditors to debtors. 
Distribution matters: debtors may have a higher marginal propensity to consume than 
creditors. If firms and households are credit constrained, lowering interest rates may 
mean that firms will have more money for investment and households will have more 
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money for consumption. In addition, there may be wealth, or balance sheet effects. 
The value of assets such as stocks and real estate increases with lower interest rates; 
and the increased wealth may induce households to consume more. 
 
Similarly, under conventional closed economy analysis, raising interest rates to slow 
an overheated economy leads to lower growth.  Due to wealth effects, the value of 
assets will fall with higher interest rates, reinforcing the conventional effects. Because 
different firms own different assets, firms’ net worth will be affected differently, often 
in ways that even informed investors may find difficult to ascertain. The interest rate 
increases thus also give rise to uncertainty, further dampening economic activity. 
Large increases in interest rates also weaken government finances when the stock of 
outstanding public debt is significant as a proportion of GDP. The consequent rise in 
interest payments on public debt can reduce the government’s fiscal flexibility. All of 
these effects reinforce the response of the economy to monetary tightening to dampen 
the economy and restrain inflation.  
 
On the other hand, recent research  also  suggests additional reasons why monetary 
policy might be  ineffective. In particular, Greenwald and Stiglitz emphasize that 
credit, and not the money supply, matters for the level of economic activity. The 
banking system is central in determining the supply of credit. Even if the interest rate 
on treasury bills falls, banks may be reluctant to lend more when they believe their 
balance sheets are weak, or when they perceive the risk of lending to be very high 
(and therefore, can achieve high, safer returns by lending to the government).43  
 
This is further complicated in an open economy by the impact of capital flows. 
Standard analysis  does not explicitly deal with capital inflows, to the extent that it 
assumes that their effects can be fully sterilized through monetary policy. But this 
analysis overlooks the impact of capital flows on the supply of credit. Capital flows 
affect the resources available to households and firms, and even affect the lending 
activity of banks. 
 
One reason why it is difficult to disen tangle the effects of monetary policy on an open 
economy, particularly one with flexible exchange rates, is that the impact on capital 
flows is hard to predict. The general view is that, other things being equal, an increase 
in a country’s real income generated by expansionary macroeconomic policies is 
likely to induce capital inflows. So too, other things being equal, an increase in the 
interest rate – associated with, say, a contractionary monetary policy – will induce 
capital inflows and lead to an exchange rate appreciation (and, alternatively, a lower 
interest rate will result in capital outflows, and a weaker exchange rate). But other 
things are never equal, particularly due to the complex interaction between interest 
rates and capital flows.  
 
In an o pen economy, lower interest rates can lead to capital outflows and a weaker 
exchange rate. This, combined with the weakened balance sheets that often result 
from exchange rate devaluations, may limit credit availability, and could attenuate, or 
even reverse, the normal impact of lower interest rates on aggregate demand. Any 
attempt by policymakers to counteract the drop in demand by lowering interest rates 
                                                  
43 There is a kind of liquidity trap, resulting not from the high elasticity of demand for money, but from 
a low elasticity of the supply of bank credit.   32 
further will be partially self-defeating, as the lower interest rates will induce even 
more capital outflows. In other words, open capital markets limit the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. 
 
On the other hand, there are important medium and long term effects of the weaker 
exchange rate that can reinforce usual the effect of lower interest rates. The weaker 
exchange rate increases the competitiveness of exporting  and import competing 
industries leading to increased output and  encouraging domestic technological 
development, as we discuss in more detail under exchange rate policies. This effect 
often occurs with a lag, so that in the short-term the effect may not be obvious. At 
times, however, the impact is immediate, as was the case in Russia following the 1998 
devaluation, as discussed below.  
 
Higher interest rates may attract capital inflows, increasing the credit supply and 
leading to higher investment, limiting or reversing the usual effect.  In addition, there 
are two medium-term effects of raising rates. First, when the central bank raises rates, 
it usually raises short term rates, attracting short term speculative capital. These flows 
often go into consumption or real estate, rather than into long-term productive 
investment. The implication is that the short-term boom is exacerbated, without a 
long-term positive impact on growth. Second, the increased inflows also lead to 
currency appreciation. This can slow the economy in the medium to long term as 
export and import-substitution industries become less competitive. The capital inflows 
can  lead to changes  in the structure of production that stymie medium to long term 
growth, while the higher rates do little to limit the short-term bubble. 
 
Furthermore,  the capital inflows repeatedly turn into outflows. In the mid-1990s in 
Thailand, speculative inflows of capital led to a real estate bubble. When the bubble 
burst in 1997, so did expectations of high and sure returns. The inflows stopped, and 
capital started rushing out of the country. In the late 1990s, Latin America was 
characterized by significant vulnerabilities due to high debt, high current account 
deficits, and currency overvaluation that had accumulated during the period of 
booming capital inflows. In 1998, a change in global sentiment towards emerging 
markets led to capital outflows. 
 
Standard recipes for dealing with a crisis call for central banks to reduce interest rates 
and for governments to stimulate the economy by increasing expenditures and/or 
cutting taxes. But countries with open capital markets often find it difficult to do 
either.  Rather than lowering interest rates in a downturn—especially  a downturn 
associated with a crisis—countries with open capital markets often raise interest rates 
to stop capital outflows.  Again, the effectiveness of monetary policy is severely 
restricted. 
 
Nonetheless, in recent years, many economists in advanced industrial economies have 
advocated greater reliance on monetary than fiscal policy for stabilization. They argue 
that the political processes required to change taxes or expenditure levels are too slow, 
and that monetary authorities can act in a timelier manner.  The limitations of 
monetary policy, noted  above, as well as the limitations on the use of fiscal policy 
discussed earlier, suggest  the need to find innovative means to use both in the face of  
the severe volatility that characterizes developing countries.  
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Monetary Policy Instruments 
 
Historically, most central banks used direct methods, such as regulations and controls, 
to manage the money supply. In the late 1970s and  mid-1980s, most industrialized 
countries moved toward indirect instruments,  which  work mainly through market 
interventions. Many developing economies followed suit as part of the push toward 
becoming ‘emerging markets’ in  the 1990s. The monetary policy standard since has 
become  inflation targeting via  interest rate adjustments. The central bank uses 
indirect measures such as open market operations to set (short term) interest rates 
close to its policy rate.  
The Central Bank of New Zealand,  for example, switched from direct to indirect 
measures in 1985. They concluded that: ‘In its earlier years, in particular, [ direct 
controls] provided effective monetary control… [but] the system made the allocation 
of credit a complex and inefficient process, biasing the flow of credit towards 
longstanding and existing borrowers.’44  
Yet, New Zealand’s experience with indirect measures has been mixed.  The same 
central bank report notes that ‘higher interest rates will often attract foreign buyers of 
New Zealand dollars, pushing up the exchange rate, and shifting some - sometimes 
much  - of the adjustment burden onto the export sector, regardless of whether any 
inflation pressures were apparent in that sector… With only one instrument to adjust - 
interest rates  - these imbalances are frustratingly inevitable: a single interest rate 
means one interest rate for all regions and one interest rate for all sectors.’  
In this section, we examine standard  monetary policy instruments and revisit the 
question of whether alternative monetary policy tools  can be designed to improve 
monetary policy effectiveness, while learning from the weaknesses of  the direct 
mechanisms used in the past. 
Indirect Monetary Policy Instruments 
 
Standard i ndirect interventions include open -market operations, changes in reserve 
requirements, and central bank lending facilities. Most developed countries use open 
market operations as their main monetary policy tool, to influence the interest rate, 
and thus, the ultimate target, inflation. Open market operations can be more difficult 
to conduct in countries with illiquid public debt markets. A second monetary tool is 
the  discount rate. The discount rate is the interest rate the central bank charges 
commercial banks for loans, which are usually short-term in nature. Some central 
banks use the discount rate as a signal; for others, especially those with less developed 
markets in which open market operations are not very effective, it is the main 
instrument of monetary policy. The central bank can also  use the discount window to 
act as a lender of last resort during liquidity shortages. 
A third method  for managing the money supply is through  reserve requirements. 
Reserve requirement stipulates that banks hold a percentage of their total reserves 
with the central bank. Reserve requirements are generally not used significantly as 
monetary policy tools in most industrialized countries. However, reserve requirements 
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can be a useful  instrument, especially when targeted  to specific sectors, as discussed 
below under ‘direct mechanisms’. 
Direct Mechanisms and Other Microeconomic Measures 
Monetary policy is a blunt tool: raising interest rates affects all sectors of the 
economy, those experiencing bubbles, as well as those experiencing fragile recoveries 
or still in recession. Rather than relying on interest rates, authorities can use  other 
measures to target specific sectors of the economy.  In this regard, there are t hree 
issues that are particularly important for developing countries: how to target bubbles; 
ways to encourage credit when constraints are specific to certain sectors of the 
economy; and  ways to encourage bank lending when credit constraints are more 
general. 
Direct measures can be extremely useful in developing countries that want to maintain 
economic growth, but worry about excessive investment in a particular sector. When 
bubbles exist, central banks can  raise reserve requirements on loans to  the sectors 
affected, such as real estate or equity markets.  This  mechanism  could  have been 
effective at limiting some of the build-up in bubbles prior to the Asian crisis. 
Similarly, many economists urged Greenspan to increase the margin requirement on 
leverage for stock exchange transactions during the technology boom in the U .S. 
Increases in taxes on capital gains can  also  be used to dampen speculative booms. 
Unlike higher interest rates and open -market operations, which entail issuing central 
bank bills that carry the higher interest rate, these types of direct mechanisms have the 
added benefit that they  do not carry large fiscal costs. 
When the banking system is inefficient, these measures can be particularly useful. 
Whereas indirect instruments generally require a well-developed money market, 
direct measures are relatively easy to implement. Many developing countries are in a 
position where administrative controls still work fairly well—far more effectively 
than traditional channels of monetary policy.  The administrative measures China 
employed in 2004 and 2005, for example, seem to have been relatively effective in 
curtailing the real estate boom. Had the government relied on interest rate increases, it 
would have squelched investments in factories and other job creation at the same time 
(or even before) it had tamed the speculative boom.  
When credit rationing exists, as it does in most developing countries, what i s relevant 
is not loan demand, but loan supply; authorities need to implement policies to induce 
banks to increase lending. For example, changing regulatory policies, such as capital 
adequacy requirements and other banking regulations, can impact credit availability. 
When inflation is due to supply shortages in sectors of the economy experiencing 
credit constraints, authorities can look to innovative ways to ensure that credit reaches 
these sectors, rather than raising interest rates and slowing the economy as a whole. 
Development banks are one tool that can help direct credit to areas in need. Recent 
research has focused on isolating market failures and constraints on growth and on 
using market mechanisms, rather than discretion, to determine those sectors in need.
45 
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More generally, i n many developing countries, banks often have excess liquidity. 
Instead of lending, they find it more attractive to buy government bonds—or even to 
buy the bonds of foreign governments or corporations. This is particularly important 
during crises: banks view lending to private firms as too risky just when the economy 
needs additional private credit to avoid a credit crunch. There are a variety of ways 
that governments and monetary authorities can, in such circumstances, encourage 
banks to lend. For instance, they can tax excess reserves, or impose taxes on capital 
gains from currency changes (to discourage banks from, in effect, engaging in foreign 
exchange speculation). They can take more explici t regulatory actions, such as not 
allowing banks to hold net foreign exchange assets (either loans or bonds). They can 
go so far as to actively discourage banks from purchasing government bonds (e.g., by 
limiting the amount of excess reserves than can be held in the form of government 
bonds, or by increasing the risk rating of such bonds).  
 
Restrictions and regulations on capital flows are another important set of tools that 
can give central banks additional independence in monetary policy, as  discussed later 
in detail. During booms, capital account regulations  give monetary authorities the 
ability to raise interest rates without attracting excessive foreign capital inflows. 
During downturns, central banks can lower rates without precipitating a massive 
outflow of capital. Prudential regulations can also be used for this purpose. 
 
The Macroeconomic Dimensions of Prudential Regulations 
 
Changes in banking regulations have more macroeconomic implications than is 
usually accepted (their effects tend to be ignored in most macroeconomic analysis). 
Banks use microeconomic risk management to  reduce the risks associated with the 
individual characteristics of borrowers, and prudential regulations have been designed 
to encourage banks to manage these risks. But it is more difficult to reduce risks 
associated with the common factors that all market agents face, such as the effects of 
macroeconomic policies and the business cycle. In recent years, increasing attention 
has been placed on risks that have a clear macroeconomic origin, and ways to use 
prudential regulations as a tool for macroeconomic policy.  
 
Traditional regulatory tools, including both Basle I and Basle II standards, have a pro -
cyclical bias.
46 In these systems, banks have to provision capital against loan 
delinquency or short-term expectations of future loan losses. Since expectations of 
losses are low during economic expansions, these systems are not effective in 
hampering excessive  risk-taking during booms. Sharp rises in loan delinquencies 
during economic slowdowns (or crises) increase bank losses, or force them to increase 
provisions for those losses, reducing their capital and their lending capacity. This may 
trigger a ‘credit squeeze’ and exacerbate the downswing in economic activity.
47 
 
Given the central role that all these processes play in developing countries’ business 
cycles, the crucial policy issue is how to introduce a countercyclical element into 
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prudential regulation and supervision.
48 Banking authorities can, for example, engage 
in forbearance: they can allow banks to continue to operate undercapitalized. (Banks 
are allowed to continue to operate in such  circumstances; regulators need to monitor 
the banks to prevent them from undertaking excessively risky loans or looting the 
bank, i.e. moral hazard problems.
49)  
 
The Spanish system of forward-looking provisions, introduced  in December 1999, is a 
major policy innovation in addressing the pro-cyclical elements of prudential 
regulation. According to this system, provisions are made when loans are disbursed 
based on expected (or ‘latent’) losses. Such ‘latent’ risks are estimated on the basis of 
a full business cycle, and are not based on the current economic environment.50 This 
system implies that provisioning follows the criteria that are traditionally used by the 
insurance industry (where provisions are made when the insurance policy is issued) 
rather than by the banking industry (where they are made when loan payments come 
due). 
 
In the Spanish system, provisions51 are accumulated in a fund52 that grows during 
economic expansions and is drawn upon during downturns. As long as the fund has 
adequate resources, banks should not need to make additional provisions for new loan 
losses during a recession. Although  growth  and drawing down of the fund has 
countercyclical dynamics, it actually just counteracts the cyclical pattern of bank 
lending. The system is, strictly speaking, ‘cycle-neutral’ rather than countercyclical, 
but it is certainly superior to the traditional  pro-cyclical provisioning for loan losses. 
 
Strictly countercyclical prudential provisions should complement such a system. 
These criteria could include holding excess provisions against loan losses when 
authorities think that there is a disproportionate growth of credit (relative to some 
benchmark), or limits on lending to sectors characterized by systematic (economy-
wide) risks, such as the construction sector. Alternatively, direct restrictions on credit 
growth, or restrictions on new lending to certain risky activities, could be used. The 
regulations also could be supplemented by more specific regulations aimed at 
controlling currency and maturity mismatches ( including those associated with 
derivatives), such as limits on foreign currency-denominated loans to the domestic 
non-tradable sectors.  Insofar as developing countries are likely to face more 
macroeconomic volatility, there may be an argument for requiring higher capital/asset 
ratios, but provisioning against loan losses is probably a better solution.53 
 
In addition, prudential regulation needs to ensure adequate levels of liquidity for 
financial intermediaries so that they can handle the mismatch between the average 
maturities of assets and liabilities. Such mismatch is inherent in the financial system’s 
essential function of transforming maturities, but it generates risks associated with 
volatility in deposits and/or  interest rates. Reserve requirements, which are strictly an 
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instrument of monetary policy, provide liquidity in many countries, but their declining 
importance makes it necessary to find new tools.  
 
An alternative system could be one in which liquidity or reserve requirements are 
estimated on the basis of the net maturity of a financial institution’s balance sheet 
based on its asset and liability structure. The valuation of assets used as collateral for 
loans also presents problems when those assets exhibit price volatility because, in 
many cases, prices used to value collaterals may be significantly higher than ex-post 
prices. Limits on loan-to-value ratios and/or rules to adjust the values of collateral for 
cyclical price variations could avoid some of these problems. 
 
We should  emphasize that any regulatory approach has clear limits and costs that 
cannot be overlooked. Prudential supervision is a discretionary activity susceptible to 
abuse. Experience also indicates that even well regulated systems in industrial 
countries are subject to periodic episodes of euphoria, when risks are underestimated. 
The 2001 crisis in Argentina is a case in which an ostensibly foolproof currency board 
and a  financial sector characterized by  dominance  of multinational banks,  proved 
unsustainable, and mounting foreign debt  clearly failed to  protect  the domestic 
financial system from the effects of currency and other macroeconomic shocks.  
 
 
Exchange Rate Policy 
 
When other instruments for stimulating the economy are limited (as they typically are 
in developing countries), a weak exchange rate can be an effective instrument for 
economic growth and job creation. Weak exchange rates increase the attractiveness of 
exporting by making the country’s products cheaper abroad, and help domestic 
industries that compete with imports (import substitution industries) by making 
foreign goods more expensive relative to domestic goods. Exchange rate policy, then, 
is not simply a tactical matter of getting-prices-right, but may turn out to be a strategic 
matter of a deliberately undervalued exchange rate, maintained over a period of time, 
to provide an entry into the world market for differentiated manufactured goods.
54 
Several Asian countries have used such strategic exchange rate policy to promote  
manufactured exports. Similarly, the build-up of the Chilean boom of the 1990s was 
clearly preceded by a weak exchange rate policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
A competitive exchange rate is seen today as an essential ingredient of dynamic 
growth and employment in developing countries.
55 It allows domestic firms to benefit 
from rapid growth in international trade and attracts international firms searching for 
the best location for their worldwide sourcing of their goods. This may also have 
positive  spillovers for domestic technological development, and lead to a process of 
learning how to produce with the best technologies available, and with the best 
marketing tools for the global economy. Furthermore, a competitive exchange rate 
means that spillovers of export production on other domestic sectors are enhanced, as 
exporters find it more attractive to buy the inputs and services they need domestically. 
In a world of reduced trade barriers, import-competing sectors see a competitive 
exchange rate as their major (and perhaps only) source of protection.  
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This is the reverse of what sometimes happens with currency appreciation. A couple 
of decades ago, this issue was dealt with in the literature on  ‘Dutch disease’,  also 
referred to as the resource curse. This literature analyzed the long-term losses that a 
boom in the availability of foreign exchange could have, due to a discovery of natural 
resources or a capital surge. More recently, there has been a growing debate on the 
impact of ‘Dutch disease’ on foreign aid, discussed below. The essential insight is that 
the booming inflows of foreign exchange lead to a real exchange rate appreciation 
that could permanently hurt other tradable sectors  – exports as well as import-
competing sectors – and could entail the permanent loss of technological and other 
spillovers from those sectors. Such ‘de-industrialization’ (as this effect is sometimes 
called) implies that booming inflows of foreign exchange may be a mixed blessing. 
 
There are, however, risks associated with devaluation. Devaluations can lead to 
inflation, since, for example, imports become more expensive. Second, there can be 
balance sheet effects. When a country (or the firms within the country) has borrowed 
and lent in foreign currencies, devaluations change the value of the country and firms’ 
overall balance sheets. This effect, for example, was particularly important in 
Indonesia during the Asian crisis. Many companies were unable to repay their large 
foreign currency liabilities after the currency devaluation raised the value of their debt 
in local currency terms, leading to widespread bankruptcies throughout the economy. 
 
Impact of devaluation 
 
Impact on Aggregate Demand and Growth 
As we have noted, currency devaluations should boost export and import-competing 
sectors and raise income and output. The effect of  devaluations on imports can, in 
some cases, be immediate. For instance, in the Russian and Argentinean devaluations, 
there was large and rapid substitution of imports with domestic products, leading to 
improvements in the trade deficit and large rebounds in output. Yet often, the effects 
on exports and some import-competing sectors take time to materialize. Furthermore, 
devaluations can also have short-term contractionary effects on aggregate demand.
56 
This may lead to what is usually referred to as a  ‘J-curve’: an initial contractionary 
effect of a devaluation followed by a longer period in which the expansionary effects 
prevail.  
 
There are several reasons why the effect of the devaluation on  exports and import-
competing sectors often occurs with a lag. It takes time for exporters to find new 
markets,  and  some of the more permanent effects may require that producers retool 
their businesses. Furthermore, if firms believe that the real devaluation is  only 
temporary because of inflation, the devaluation will produce only limited new 
investments in exports or import-competing industries. Before firms are willing to 
invest, they need to be convinced that the increase in profitability that results from the 
devaluation will be sustainable.  
 
There are also several reasons why the initial effect of devaluations may  be 
contractionary. The first arises from the adverse effect the devaluation may have on 
real wages. If increases in wages lag the increase in prices of imported and exported 
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consumer goods, aggregate demand and output will fall as consumers’ purchasing 
power falls. (A similar effect is produced if the money supply is slow to adjust to 
higher prices.)  When domestic firms face credit constraints and h ave trouble 
borrowing, the short term contractionary effects of a devaluation can be especially 
large. Export-oriented and import-substitution firms might not have the capital to pay 
for imported intermediate or capital goods, and may find it difficult to  invest and 
increase capacity to meet the new demand. 
 
Finally, devaluations also entail significant redistribution, especially in the short run. 
Exporters benefit, while importers lose. Debtors in foreign currencies lose while those 
who own net assets in foreign currencies benefit. Also, as we have seen, wages may 
lag. The losers often become vocal opponents of devaluation, while the long-run 
benefits to the economy derived from devaluation (increased exports and greater sales 
of import substitution goods) may be harder to see in the short run.  
 
Overall, the consensus is that normally, the positive effects on exports and import 
substitution industries outweigh the negative effects, so that devaluations are 
expansionary in the medium to long run. Furthermore, governments can act to reduce 
or offset some of these adverse effects by implementing heterodox policies, such as 
providing additional trade credit or temporary investment tax credits for domestically 
produced investment goods. 
Impact on Inflation 
In general, the magnitude and durability of the effects of a weakening currency 
depends on its impact on inflation and the net effect on the real exchange rate. We 
begin our analysis by looking at the direct impact of exchange rate changes on prices. 
If we assume the exchange rate weakens, the devaluation will lead to higher prices of 
imported and exported goods. Imports become more expensive in local currency 
terms, as do exported goods, since firms generally receive a higher price in foreign 
markets in local currency terms.  
 
The magnitude of the inflationary impact is likely to depend on the proportion of 
imported goods in the economy, especially intermediate and capital goods. When 
imported goods are large, the devaluation can lead to increased costs of production in 
many industries. This may be a ‘once and for all’ effect: the higher prices of tradable 
goods are reflected in the domestic price indices at once, with no further impact on 
prices. But it could also lead to an inflationary spiral.  
 
Whether inflationary worries are justified depends in large part on expectations, the 
structure of the economy (i.e. the import content of output, the extent of indexation, 
such as cost-of-living clauses in nominal contracts), and on how the government and 
other economic actors respond to exchange rate movements. For example, workers 
may react to the initial inflationary effect by demanding higher wages.  
 
It appears that when there is sufficient slack in the economy (when unemployment, 
for instance, is high enough), devaluations have generally not  given rise to sustained 
inflation, at least in recent years. We saw marked exchange rate devaluations without 
inflationary spirals in East Asia, Argentina, and Brazil after the East Asian and Latin 
American crises in the 1990s. The same was true for India, following its external 
debt-crisis, earlier in the 1990s.  Expectations depend, at least in part, on history.   40 
Recent history has shown that there is no reason that even large devaluations will be 
followed by episodes of sustained inflation. This means that, going forward, it is less 
likely that devaluations will give rise to indexation and inflationary expectations.  
 
Overall, the benefits to growth from  exchange rate stability and competitiveness 
typically outweigh the costs associated with mild inflation. The impact of devaluation, 
however, also depends on how monetary authorities respond to any resulting inflation. 
If the monetary authorities respond by raising interest rates (as they might, following 
strict inflation targeting rules), the devaluation’s positive impact—the economic 
expansion of export and import-competitive sectors and its possible spillovers to the 
rest of the economy—will be reduced. Raising rates to respond to the threat of 
increased inflation posed by a currency devaluation is problematic, even when 
combating inflation is a goal. (The key question, as discussed above, is whether the 
devaluation leads to a one-time increase in prices, or whether it will lead to further 
price rises and an increase in the rate of inflation.) 
 
Real Balance Sheet Effects 
When a country (or the firms within the country) have borrowed and lent in foreign 
currencies, devaluations will change the value of the country’s and the firms’ overall 
balance sheets. These b alance sheet effects can have the effect of making exchange 
rate policies pro-cyclical: i nstead of experiencing the expected gains from increased 
competitiveness, the country can experience an economic slowdown due to increased 
bankruptcies and a credit contraction.  
 
As we ha ve noted, the value of foreign currency liabilities rises in relation to domestic 
assets following devaluations. Debtors, for example,  might have more difficulty 
repaying loans to foreign creditors. This effect was particularly important in Indonesia 
during the Asian crisis. Many companies were unable to repay their large foreign 
currency liabilities after the currency devaluation raised the value of their debt in local 
currency terms. The increased bankruptcies that result can  have adverse effects on 
growth and output throughout the economy .  
 
If a country is a net foreign debtor , a devaluation will generally make the country 
worse off. The value of the country’s  liabilities will increase, and the weaker balance 
sheet of indebted firms will depress consumption and investment. (This is one reason 
the Asian crisis was so severe.) If a country is a net creditor, it will be better off, on 
average, because foreign denominated assets will be worth more. But even if the 
country is a net creditor overall, some firms will be net debtors, and the economic 
consequences of their losses might more than offset the benefits  to  the  better off 
firms. So the impact of a currency devaluation will depend heavily on assessment of 
the balance sheets of domestic firms, households, and the government. Moreover, 
because creditors generally do not know the exact balance sheet of each firm to whom 
they lend, and firms do not know the balance sheet of each firm with which they 
interact, large devaluations give rise to extreme uncertainty. 
 
If a country has large sovereign external borrowings, a currency devaluation will raise 
the government’s cost of borrowing and increase its risk of default— sometimes so 
much so that countries are afraid to let their currencies weaken. The increased cost 
means that governments may have to cut back real domestic expenditures, so the net   41 
effect of the devaluation might be negative: the cutbacks in government expenditures 
might exceed the increase in net exports.  
 
These balance sheet effects point to the i mportance of governments managing their 
foreign liability exposure.  Furthermore, a  good institutional framework can help 
minimize private balance sheet effects of devaluations. Prudential regulations in place 
prior to the devaluation can limit the amount of banks’ (and indirectly, firms’) foreign 
currency exposure. If the country has a good bankruptcy law—say model led after 
chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code, which allows fairly rapid corporate 
reorganizations—the costs on the country can be limited.57 
 
In order to design effective economic policies, we need to appraise the situation of 
each particular country. If a country is a net debtor in foreign currency the devaluation 
will generally have negative balance sheet effects. If a country is a net creditor, it will 
generally have positive balance sheet effects. These balance sheet effects then need to 
be weighed against the benefits of a weaker exchange rate on growth and 
development discussed earlier.  Initial conditions matter. The structure of balance 
sheets matters; the institutional framework matters; the choice of currency regime 
matters.  
 
The Debate on Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
Fixed and floating rate regimes 
Under a fixed (or pegged) rate regime, policymakers target the exchange rate and 
monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market by buying or selling 
international reserves to maintain the peg. In doing so, they severely limit their ability 
to pursue monetary and fiscal policies (e.g. lowering rates generally leads to capital 
inflows,  putting pressure on the peg ). Under a flexible, or pure floating, exchange rate 
regime, the government does not  need to buy or sell reserves. The exchange rate is 
endogenous (or determined by the market), but authorities influence it through fiscal 
or monetary policies.  The effectiveness of monetary  (and fiscal ) policies in open 
economies is still limited by the effects of capital flows (as discussed above), though 
less so than with a fixed rate.  
 
Most countries  do not maintain either a pure fixed or floating regime. Rather, they 
engage in some type of managed or ‘dirty’ float. In these intermediate regimes, 
authorities intervene periodically (sometimes according to specified rules) by buying 
and selling international reserves, as in the fixed rate system. But they have somewhat 
more flexibility than if they operated under a pure fixed rate, and the effectiveness of 
monetary and fiscal policies is somewhere in between the two extreme cases.  
 
In choosing an exchange rate regime, developing countries are faced with a trade-off 
between their need for stability and their need for flexibility. The demand for stability 
comes from  its positive impact on investment, as well as  the need to avoid  pro -
cyclical balance sheet effects of exchange rate fluctuations. The demand for flexibility 
comes from the need to have some degrees of freedom to manage trade and capital 
account shocks. The relative benefits of flexibility vs. stability are determined by both 
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the external environment and objective factors. For example, increased international 
instability (e.g., the breakdown of the dollar standard, a period of turmoil in world 
finance for emerging markets, or a world recession) will increase the relative benefits 
of flexibility, whereas a period of tranquillity (e.g., the h eyday of the Bretton Woods 
system, or a period of stable world economic growth) will increase the relative 
advantages of stability.  
 
The relevance of these conflicting demands is not captured by the call to choose polar 
exchange rate regimes  –  i.e., either  ‘hard pegs’ (e.g. currency boards or even 
dollarization or euroization) or totally flexible exchange rates. Rather, the defence of 
polar regimes is based on the argument that any attempt to manage the conflicting 
demands on exchange rate policy is futile and should be given up altogether.  
 
Hard pegs introduce built-in institutional arrangements that provide for fiscal and 
monetary discipline, and avoid the balance sheet effects of exchange rate fluctuations, 
but at the cost of eliminating monetary policy autonomy. Under this type of regime, 
adjustment to overvaluation (however that might occur) is painful, and may lead to 
low growth rates. When the currency becomes overvalued, domestic prices and wages 
need to fall for the country to regain competitiveness. More price flexibility, which in 
this case means deflation (and recession) during crises, generates severe adjustment 
problems; of particular concern is the rapid increase in real debt burdens generated by 
deflation. It may also generate a short-term bias in bank lending, which is necessary to 
rapidly reduce nominal portfolios during periods of monetary contraction. One of the 
alleged advantages of the hard peg was that it was supposed to be speculation proof. 
But the experiences of currency boards in Argentina in 1994-1995 and 1998-2001, 
Hong Kong in 1997 (and, for that matter, of the gold standard in developing countries 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries) indicate that this has not been the case. 
 
When a currency is overvalued, it is often n ot a question of whether the fixed rate 
should be maintained, but when  and how  it will be  devalued. It  is preferable to 
devalue gradually than to have a crisis (in which there is often overshooting). Slow, or 
creeping, devaluations also avoid major price shocks. In addition, raising interest rates 
to maintain the currency may have even more adverse effects on the economy than the 
devaluation itself. The questions that policymakers need to address are: what are the 
costs and benefits of interventions in foreign exchange markets, and when are these 
interventions sustainable.  
 
On the other hand, the volatility associated with freely floating exchange rate regimes 
increases the costs of trade and reduces the benefits of international specialization. As 
developing countries are largely net importers of capital goods, exchange rate 
uncertainty also affects investment decisions.  
 
Int erventions in the Foreign Exchange Market 
Maintaining an undervalued exchange rate is considerably easier than maintaining an 
overvalued exchange rate, but this too has costs.  To maintain an undervalued 
exchange rate, governments can lower interest rates (to discourage capital inflows) or 
can intervene in the exchange rate market directly by buying dollars and selling the 
local currency. Maintaining an undervalued exchange rate through direct intervention 
produces a build-up of international reserves. This has a long-term benefit: it protects 
the country against future capital account volatility (it acts as a ‘war chest’). But   43 
buying up  international reserves has costs. The central bank has to sell domestic 
currency to buy the reserves, and this increases the money supply. To keep the money 
supply within limits, authorities may choose to  ‘sterilize’ the monetary effect of the 
foreign exchange intervention by selling domestic assets and buying the additional 
currency from the market.  
 
The mechanisms generally used (e.g. open market operations) are somewhat costly as 
they involve issuing central bank bonds, which pay interest, to absorb the excess 
liquidity. Furthermore, these interventions may lead to higher interest rates, raising 
the overall cost of government funding. The higher rates might attract more capital, 
overheating the economy, and forcing even larger reserve accumulations. Raising 
reserve requirements on banks is a less costly means to sterilize, but may lead to 
higher credit costs and to financial disintermediation (in which banks use unregulated 
mechanisms to channel liquid funds).  
 
There can be an additional cost to purchasing foreign currency reserves at an 
undervalued exchange rate: if the currency does eventually revalue, then the value of 
the foreign reserves will drop relative to domestic GDP. The question is whether and 
when the costs of sterilization can become too great to maintain and outweigh the 
benefits of a weak exchange rate. Sterilization is especially costly for countries with 
relatively high interest rates and high levels of government debt. In the late 1990s, the 
Hungarian central bank, for example, felt that sterilization had become too expensive 
and let its exchange rate strengthen. On the other hand, the costs of letting a currency 
strengthen are  often  greater than the costs of maintaining reserves. China has 
maintained an exchange rate that some have argued has been undervalued for 
extended periods. Unlike Hungary, China has maintained its capital account 
restrictions, giving it more leeway to manage its money supply.  
 
While  it is  possible for a country to maintain an undervalued exchange rate for 
extended periods of time,  it is far more difficult for it to maintain an overvalued 
exchange rate, even for short periods of time. Direct intervention in the currency 
market is unsustainable. If the devaluation is expected to occur in the not too distant 
future, a  speculative attack will be mounted now. The standard prescription to stem 
exchange rate depreciation is to raise interest rates to attract capital into the country. 
Two questions have been raised concerning this conventional policy prescription: 
does it work, and are the benefits worth the costs? The evidence58 suggests a mixed 
record at best. In the case of East Asia, the interest rate increases, even combined with 
huge bail-outs, did not stem the large exchange rate depreciations. 
 
The cost of raising interest rates to defend the currency depends on the structure of the 
economy, but can be high, as we saw during the Asian crisis. There are real balance 
sheet effects, similar to the effects of currency devaluation. For firms with outstanding 
short term debts, high interest rates affect their balance sheets. The high rates reduce 
the value of long-term assets (including real estate). In many cases, firms are unable 
to meet their interest obligations on domestic debt in local currency. This has a ripple 
effect through the economy, as economic problems in one firm get pushed to the firms 
they trade with. Banks balance sheets are weakened and new lending falls.  
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In short, raising interest rates has similar adverse effects to devaluing the exchange 
rate on balan ce sheets, bankruptcies, and economic activity. But there are differences. 
First, the effects of raising interest rates are more pervasive, since many firms—
especially small and medium sized enterprises at the heart of developing countries—
only borrow domestically. Relatively few, mostly large firms, borrow internationally, 
and many of these are in export sectors, so that in the event of a devaluation, they gain 
from the improvement in their profitability what they lose on their balance sheet. 
Second, a policy of attempting to stave off devaluations by raising interest rates 
contributes to a moral hazard problem—it lessens the incentives to buy insurance 
against exchange rate fluctuation or to  borrow in the local currency, thereby reducing 
government room for manoeuvre.  Third, there are high long run costs to raising 
interest rates,  as discussed earlier. Finally, appropriately designed monetary and 
regulatory policies can restrict firm exposure to foreign exchange rates; it’s more 
difficult (and costly) to design monetary policies that restrict exposure to interest rate 
fluctuations. Firms would have to restrict their short term borrowing (and there are 
even risks to long term borrowing, since it has to be renewed).  
 
In addition to  trying to maintain  an overvalued or undervalued exchange rate, 
government intervention in the currency market is often  used to smooth  exchange rate 
variations. Many developing countries are particularly concerned about the volatility 
of the  real exchange rate and try to avoid what they judge as either excessive real 
depreciations or appreciations. Most countries also intervene to smooth short-term 
volatility. This form of intervention is especially useful in countries with illiquid 
markets, where one large foreign currency payment can cause the currency to jump. 
The reasons to avoid real exchange rate fluctuations are clear. Temporary real 
exchange rate appreciation can have especially large long-term costs if entry into 
tradable sectors has fixed costs (fixed capital investments or fixed costs of building a 
clientele in foreign markets), especially in the presence of capital market 
imperfections. The absence of a complete set of futures and risk markets provide 
another reason for government intervention; in these circumstances, the market 
equilibrium would not be efficient, even when expectations are fully rational.   
 
Intermediate regimes 
The frequency of  ‘dirty floats’, or floating rate regimes with limited flexibility,
59 
shows how authorities in the developing world often opt for striking a balance 
between the conflicting demands they face. Intermediate exchange rate regimes can 
take several forms: (a) quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes with large central bank 
interventions in foreign exchange markets; (b) managed exchange rates, such  as 
crawling pegs and bands; and (c) dirty floats, in which monetary authorities intervene 
in the market from time to time. All these regimes can be understood as including an 
element of ‘real exchange rate targeting’ in the design of macroeconomic policy, and 
many or most of them are often combined with some form of capital account 
regulations, we discussed  below. To the extent that smoothing out real exchange rate 
fluctuations has a countercyclical effect, ‘real exchange rate targeting’ turns out to be 
complementary with the objective of smoothing real (output) volatility.  
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One of the advantages of intermediate regimes is that flexibility can be graduated, 
depending on the relative benefits of stability vs. flexibility that we have analyzed. 
This implies that any intermediate regime has an embedded  ‘exit option’. (Of course, 
even a peg has an exit option, but as the Argentine experience showed, the cost of that 
exit was high.) Also, if some degree of exchange rate flexibility is available before an 
external  crisis hits, it would provide scope for avoiding the real interest rate 
overshooting that seems to characterize the transition away from a fixed exchange rate 
regime in developing countries. 
 
There are still risks associated with intermediate regimes. The scope for monetary 
autonomy is still limited. First, as with fixed rate regimes, intermediate options are 
subject to speculative pressures if they do not generate credibility in markets. 
Defending the exchange rate may be costly, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This is 
particularly true of any pre-announcement (of the rate of the crawl, of a band, or of a 
specific exchange rate target). Second, macroeconomic autonomy still depends on the 
effectiveness of capital account regulations as a macroeconomic policy tool,  as 
discussed below.  Third, similar to fixed rate regimes, intermediate regimes will 
generally require sterilized intervention in foreign exchange markets, which can be 
costly. Finally, interventions in the foreign exchange market always face the difficult 
choice of distinguishing between a real (permanent) shock and a temporary aberration 
in the exchange rate caused by random fluctuations in market sentiment.  
 
In short,  no exchange rate system is risk free. D ifferent regimes have different 
benefits and costs. Like all economic policies, the choice of currency regime involves 
trade-offs. The optimal choice will depend on the objectives of the authorities, and on 





In addition to direct management of the exchange rate, microeconomic interventions 
can be used to impact relative prices. For example, microeconomic policies can  be 
used to change the composition of demand towards non-tradables and away from 
imports. Tax policies that encourage more spending on domestically produced goods 
and less on goods produced abroad will help to stimulate the economy, and at the 
same time, strengthen the currency. In many developing countries, most l uxury 
consumption goods are imported. A high sales tax on such goods discourages these 
imports.  Government expenditures can also be weighted towards domestically 
produced goods.    46 
 
Box 3: Managing Dutch Disease 
 
Foreign aid used to finance domestic expenditures can contribute to overvaluation of 
the exchange rate, making domestic exporters and import competing industries less 
competitive, through the effect known as  the ‘ Dutch disease’.  Assuming  that 
significant foreign exchange inflows will have a macroeconomic effect,  this note 
concentrates on potential policy responses. 
 
The general view is that countries should intervene in the exchange market to keep the 
currency from appreciating, and sterilize inflows to minimize the inflationary impact 
of the increase in domestic money supply. If aid flows go into long-term productive 
investments, the productivity gains from the investment can compensate for the 
strengthening of the nominal exchange rate. In addition, if inflows are used to 
purchase imported goods, the effects of the increased aid on the exchange rate will be 
limited.60 However, there are real questions of whether, on average, the increase in aid  
will be invested in projects that generate improved productivity significant enough to 
compensate for the loss in competitiveness due to the exchange rate strengthening, 
especially in the short to medium term. Furthermore, countries often need aid to 
finance social spending and basic services for the poor that will not be productivity 
enhancing, at least in the short run.  
 
Policymakers can  try to constrain exchange appreciation by buying foreign exchange 
inflows (and building up reserves) in conjunction with sterilization. With limited 
amounts of aid, this can be an effective strategy. But intervention has costs and is not 
always sustainable. The build-up in international reserves has opportunity costs, and 
sterilization raises domestic interest rates.  
 
Furthermore, sterilization generally involves issuing Treasury bills to absorb the 
excess liquidity. In other words, the increase in aid has the perverse effect of leading 
to a build-up in domestic debt. It is ironic that just as the international community has 
moved to replace loans with grants in an attempt to avoid developing country debt 
crises, the policy framework used to manage these inflows is leading to a new build-
up in debt. Yet, aid inflows can be crucial for development and poverty reduction in 
poor countries; policymakers need to think about alternative frameworks to manage 
these inflows. 
 
One possible alternative is for the central banks to choose not to sterilize the inflows; 
instead, they would allow the inflows to be monetized. All policies have trade-offs: 
borrowing from the market through open market operations leads to higher interest 
rates, which can crowd out investment; monetizing can lead to inflation. But, as  we 
have discussed, relatively low inflation does not necessarily have high costs. When a 
country is in a recession and in need of investment, monetizing  could be an option. 
(Of course, the central bank would need to monitor the inflation rate to make sure it 
does not become excessive. In addition, monetization can be done in conjunction with 
accounting frameworks and safeguards to fully monitor the increase in money 
supply.) 
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An alternative policy stance would allow the exchange rate to strengthen somewhat 
and to look to policies to counteract the effect of the strengthening exchange rate on 
competitiveness. Exchange rates, like interest rates, are blunt instruments, affecting all 
sectors of the economy. One goal of alternative policy instruments is to target sectors 
subject to credit constraints. In the case of appreciating exchange rates, authorities can 
similarly target sectors of the economy hurt by exchange rate strengthening (to try to 
compensate them for the loss of competitiveness). In theory, tariffs could be used to 
adjust specific relative prices, though WTO and other trade treaties have reduced the 
ability to impose tariffs. But tax incentives, reduced interest loans, or reduced  reserve 
requirements can have similar effects. The government needs to look to alternative 
microeconomic instruments to counteract the impact of the strengthening exchange 
rate. 
 
Ultimately, the choice of policy response to Dutch Disease effects will depend on 
country specific  circumstances, but the macroeconomic framework of intervention 
and sterilization is not the only policy alternative. Policymakers can manage the trade-
offs of the effects on interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation through intervention 
in the currency market, sterilization, monetization, and heterodox policies to target 
those sectors impacted most by a loss of competitiveness. 
 
 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy Rules and Institutional Design 
 
The choice of exchange rate regime i s closely related to the broader question of what 
monetary policy rules the central bank should follow, and the institutional design of 
the central bank itself. There are three distinct but related questions: whether the 
central bank should follow monetary policy rules, such as fixing the currency or 
inflation targeting, or whether it should follow  discretionary policies; whether the 
mandate of the central bank should focus on inflation or whether it should include 
other policy variables, such as growth and employment; and whether the central bank 
should be independent. 
 
Rules vs. Discretion and Inflation Targeting vs. Foreign Exchange Targeting61 
 
In the 1980s, the orthodox rule prescribed money supply growth at a constant rate. 
Then, it became clear that the demand function for money was unstable and hard to 
predict, especially in developing countries, and the money supply rule lost favour. 
Many developing countries chose to targ et the exchange rate since it was viewed as a 
simple and transparent indicator. But the exchange rate crises in the mid to late 1990s 
led to a shift to flexible exchange rate regimes, and today, inflation targeting62 is the 
preferred monetary rule.  
 
Most Keynesian economists believe that central bankers should be allowed to use 
more discretion than allowed by strict rules. Because strict inflation targeting rules do 
not distinguish between inflation fuelled by expectations and inflation fuelled by VAT 
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increases or external shocks (such as food or other supply shortages, oil price rises or 
exchange rate devaluations) it can lead to pro -cyclical policies. For example, inflation 
targeting can lead to exchange rate targeting or contractionary monetary policies 
during devaluation, counteracting the exchange rate effect on competitiveness. 
Inflation targeting often incorporates two widely used pro-cycl ical policies: anchoring 
the price level to a fixed exchange rate during periods of foreign exchange inflows 
and counterbalancing the inflationary effects of devaluation  with  contractionary 
monetary policies during periods of outflows. Strict  inflation targeting can therefore 
generate more output volatility than monetary policy goals that take into account other 
objectives such as reducing the output gap.63 
 
The key problem faced by the authorities during booms is that capital surges exert 
expansionary aggregate demand effects that are enhanced by downward pressure on 
interest rates and/or exchange rate appreciation. Any attempt by policymakers to 
counteract these aggregate demand effects through contractionary monetary policies 
will be partly self-defeating, as the higher interest rates will induce additional capital 
inflows, and thus additional appreciation pressures. During crises, the reduction of 
capital inflows will have a direct effect on aggregate demand, which will be combined 
with a mix of devaluation and interest rate hikes. Any attempt to avoid the latter by 
using expansionary monetary policy will encourage a stronger devaluation. Thus, if 
authorities consider that the exchange rate fluctuations generated by boom-bust cycles 
are too strong to start with, they may be encouraged to use pro-cyclical monetary 
policy to smooth out those fluctuations. In other words, contrary to the traditional 
argument about the additional degrees of freedom for monetary policy (discussed 
below) provided by floating exchange rates, such a regime may, in fact, lead to pro -
cyclical monetary policies. The only way to guarantee adequate degrees of freedom 
for countercyclical monetary policies may thus be to give up free floating, free capital 
mobility, or both. 
 
A second issue to consider in choosing monetary regimes is the efficiency or stability 
of the inflation-targeting rule. This is more complicated than can be addressed in this 
note, but we will discuss it briefly. It concerns, for instance, the extent to which (and 
the circumstances under which) conventionally measured changes in inflation provide 
a good indicator of whether employment is above or below the full employment level. 
There is, in addition, a more fundamental question surrounding inflation targeting: 
whether a policy structure – in which monetary authorities focus on inflation and 
fiscal authorities focus, for instance, on external balance – is a good way of achieving 
the ultimate objective of full employment with external balance. 
 
Under inflation targeting, the government or monetary authority announces a target 
for the inflation rate, and the monetary authorities commit to achieve this target. 
Inflation targeting divides responsibilities between government and a monetary 
authority, so that each policymaker focuses on a single objective. The problem is that 
dividing responsibilities reduces coordination.  
 
The nature of the response to excess aggregate demand should depend on an analysis 
of the source of the disturbance. A rule that simply looks at the magnitude of the 
inflation rate is not likely to provide for a quick adjustment of the economy to the new 
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equilibrium. Monetary authorities  cannot  detach themselves from the broader 
objectives of macroeconomic policy, such as full employment and external balance. 
They must coordinate the appropriate response to the specific source of disturbance 
with the fiscal authorities. Dividing responsibilities between the two authorities in a 
simple way, as assumed  in the ‘inflation targeting’ rule, is not an effective way to 
manage macroeconomic policy.  Inflation targeting doesn’t provide a smooth 
convergence to an equilibrium with both external and internal balance, since t o 
achieve full employment and external balance, it’s crucial to coordinate monetary, 
fiscal, and exchange rate policies. 
 
Central Bank Mandate 
 
Many countries have narrowed the mandate of the central bank to fighting inflation. 
In the United States, however, the Federal’s Reserve mandate is not only to ensure 
price stability, but also to promote growth and full employment. A Bank of England 
Survey of 94 Central Banks found that only 26 per cent had monetary stability as their 
only objective; 70 per cent had monetary stability combined with other goals; 3  per 
cent had no statutory goals; 1 per cent had only non-monetary stability as its goal.64 
 
There is some evidence
65 that independent central banks with an inflation target do 
achieve lower levels of inflation—it would be striking if they didn’t. But inflation is 
only an intermediate variable. The significant question is whether economies with this 
institutional structure achieve better performance in real terms: growth, 
unemployment, poverty, equality. There is little evidence that independent central 
banks focusing exclusively on price stability do better in these crucial respects.
 66 As 
mentioned above, a sole focus on price stability might lead to greater instability in 
financial variables. Simple theoretical models suggest the following: with shifting 
demand and supply curves (common during crises like those in many developing 
countries in the 1990s), an attempt to stabilize prices can easily destabilize output; 
price adjustments are meant to buffer quantity adjustments, and reducing the scope for 




Central banks make decisions that affect every aspect of society, including rates of 
economic growth and unemployment. Because there are tradeoffs, these decisions can 
only be made as part of a political process, as discussed  in the next section.  
 
Independent Central Bank 
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67 There is a line of research which suggests that that is not the case, and has attempted to explain this 
seeming anomaly. Goodfriend and King (2001), for example, argue that maintaining price stability 
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because it facilitates agents’ learning. 
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An independent central bank has been promoted as the most appropriate institutional 
arrangement to separate monetary policymaking from the political process. There are, 
however, two main criticisms of this approach.  
 
The first criticism is that the arrangement can undermine democratic governance. 
Citizens consider few issues more important than the quality of macroeconomic 
management. By delegating authority over the economy to an independent central 
bank, the government is being held accountable for something over which it does not 
have authority. Moreover,  we have seen that macroeconomic management entails 
trade-offs, with different decisions affecting the well-being of different groups. Such 
decisions are necessarily political. Delegating them to technocrats who are 
‘independent’ from the government undermines democratic accountability.  
 
While economists and politicians have long discussed the desirability of independent 
central banks,  they have  spent much less time considering the importance of 
representativeness (or lack thereof) of these banks. The two concepts are distinct. The 
problem in many countries is that the governing body of the central bank is typically 
not representative of society and its broader interests. Governments more sensitive to 
democratic processes argue that they, and not the central bank, should set targets, such 
as an inflation target, because the decision involves trade-offs, such as the trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. But even a government specified inflation 
target does not depoliticize the conduct of monetary policy. The central bank is 
responsible for reaching the target, and missing i t still can have costs that not 
everyone in society bears equally. Independent central banks also undermine effective 
macroeconomic policy coordination, management and implementation.  
 
 
IV.   CAPITAL MARKET INTERVENTIONS AND 
OTHER POLICY OPTIONS FOR OPEN 
ECONOMIES 
 
So far, in this note, we have focused on fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. 
We have also presented several heterodox measures as alternatives or enhancements 
to these. One of the most important set of economic tools available to policymakers is 
capital account controls and regulations.  In this  section,  we will  consider  some 
additional microeconomic tools for macroeconomic management, focusing on capital 
market interventions. 
 
Interventions in Capital Markets 
 
In the face of market failures in financial markets, pro-cyclical capital flows and 
limited room to manoeuvre for macroeconomic policy, capital market interventions 
can  be used to  serve multiple purposes. First, they can stabilize short-term volatile 
capital flows. Second, they can give policymakers additional instruments that allow 
them more effective and less costly macroeconomic stabilization measures. Third, 
effective capital account regulations can promote growth by reducing the volatility of 
financing and the volatility of real  macroeconomic performance. Finally, they can 
also discourage long-term capital outflows. Of all the objectives of intervention listed, 
discouraging long-term capital outflows is perhaps the most difficult. Yet   51 
interventions can be effective, even if controls are partially circumvented. The most 
critical issue today is not whether market interventions are desirable in theory, but 
whether, in practice, policymakers can design interventions whose benefit to an 
economy outweigh the ancillary costs.  
 
Price and Quantity Based Controls on Inflows and Outflows 
There are different types of capital account regulations. Capital controls include 
quantity and price-based regulations, both of which can be administered on either 
inflows or outflows. In addition, some countries use indirect regulations, such as 
prudential regulations on financial institutions or regulations on investments of 
pension funds, which have implications for capital flows. Thus, a broader concept of 
capital account restrictions is useful to understand the complementary use of, and 
overlap among, different forms of regulation.  
Traditional quantity-based capital restrictions (administrative restrictions and 
controls) continue to be widely used by developing countries, including key countries 
such as China and India, despite the gradual liberalization of their capital accounts. 
These regulations are used to target either inflows or outflows on domestic or foreign 
residents. Regulations that affect domestic residents include restrictions on currency 
mismatches (only companies with foreign exchange revenues can borrow abroad), 
end-use limitations (borrowing abroad is allowed only for investment and foreign 
trade), minimum maturities for borrowing abroad, limitations on the type of agents 
that can raise funds abroad through ADRs
68 and similar instruments, prohibition on 
borrowing in foreign currencies by non-corporate residents and, in some countries, 
overall quantitative ceilings. Limitations on non-residents include restrictions or a 
prohibition on their capacity to borrow in the domestic markets, direct regulations of 
portfolio flows (including explicit approval and limitations on the assets in which they 
can invest), sectoral restrictions on FDI, and minimum stay periods. 
Other countries, such as Chile and Colombia, implemented price-based interventions 
on inflows (an unremunerated reserve requirement, equivalent to a tax on inflows). 
Argentina introduced a similar mechanism in the mid-1990s. Such measures aim to 
discourage inflows or outflows by raising associated costs. Price-based interventions 
are often mixed with some quantity based interventions. For example,  Malaysia 
introduced a tax on outflows during the Asian crisis, after a short period in which it 
used quantitative controls, but still maintained quantity restrictions on currency 
mismatches by not allowing domestic agents without foreign exchange revenues to 
borrow abroad. Similarly, Chile maintained a one-year minimum maturity on most 
capital inflows, and Colombia directly regulated the inflows and investments of 
foreign investment funds throughout the 1990s. 
Economists have a strong  preference for price-based, as opposed to quantity-based, 
interventions. Price-based interventions are flexible, non-discretionary and thus less 
susceptible to bureaucratic manipulation, and in line with market incentives. But the 
case for price-based interventions is far from clear. Theoretical work in economics 
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has shown that sometimes quantity-based restrictions can reduce risk more effectively 
than price interventions.
69 
Most economists also prefer regulating inflows to outflows. There are several reasons 
for this. First, regulating inflows helps prevents crises, which should be the ultimate 
goal of policymaking. Second, regulating inflows involves less uncertainty and more 
transparency: creditors know the cost of regulations before they invest. But, again, the 
arguments against regulating outflows are not clear-cut. For example, restrictions on 
outflows may be the only way to solve  a collective action  problem or coordination 
market failure. When markets exhibit herding behaviour (and creditors and investors 
pull their funds out of a country during a crisis because they are afraid that others will 
pull their funds out first), restrictions on outflows may be the only instrument 
available to avoid a downward recessionary spiral.  Markets generally overshoot in 
these circumstances, so the restrictions are welfare enhancing.  
The empirical evidence shows that all types of instruments can have positive effects, 
depending on t he circumstances under which each mechanism is applied. 
Policymakers in China, India and Malaysia were able to use quantitative capital 
account regulations to achieve critical macroeconomic objectives, including 
prevention of maturity mismatches, attraction of favoured forms of foreign 
investment, reduction in overall financial fragility, and insulation from speculative 
pressures and contagion effects of financial crises  – leading to greater economic 
policy autonomy.
70 
There is some evidence that regulations on capital inflows in Chile, Colombia, and 
Malaysia 71 proved useful in inducing better debt profiles, restraining asset bubbles, 
and improving the macroeconomic trade-offs faced by authorities. In the latter case, 
they achieved a variable mix between reducing overall inflows and generating a 
higher domestic interest rate spread that allowed for a more restrictive monetary 
policy to work during periods of booming capital inflows. However, the 
macroeconomic effects, including on asset prices, depended on the  strength of the 
regulations and tended to be temporary in the case of the unremunerated reserve 
requirements used by Chile and Colombia, which operated more as  ‘speed bumps’ 
than as permanent speed restrictions. In contrast, effective quantity-based controls on 
inflows adopted by Malaysia in 1994 proved to be much stronger in terms of stopping 
the massive capital surge that the country had experienced in the early 1990s. Thus, 
when immediate and drastic action is needed, quantitative controls may be more 
effective. 
The experience of Malaysia illustrates the fallacy of another argument often put 
forward: that controls on outflows ‘deter future inflows of all kinds.’72 This argument 
was used to criticize Malaysia’s controls when they were established in 1998. But 
even before the tax was lifted in 2001, Malaysia started attracting additional inflows. 
Investors are forward looking, and Malaysia’s positive fundamentals (its current 
account surplus, high savings ratio, moderate external liabilities with a low share  of 
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short-term debts, large international reserves, and strengthening stock market) drew 
these additional funds into the country.
73 
The capital account interventions discussed above all work by essentially segmenting 
domestic markets from international markets. There is another category of restrictions 
called ‘soft controls’ that aim to segment the market directly. 
Soft Controls: Encouraging Market Segmentation 
Soft controls can require domestic funds, such as social security or pension funds, to 
invest their assets in domestic markets and can prohibit or limit  investment abroad. 
These restrictions  reduce the funds’ potential to generate pro-cyclical disturbances. 
Soft controls have an additional positive effect  of creating a local demand for 
domestic securities and helping to develop the local capital markets, and build a 
domestic capital base.  
This kind of control might become particularly relevant in the future because of the 
growth of privately managed pension funds in many developing countries, especially 
in Latin America. In Chile (the pioneer in this area), such funds are equivalent to 70 
per cent of annual GDP. Most countries place limits on the extent to which domestic 
funds can invest abroad, and have experienced new sustained growth in domestic 
markets, in large part because of the increased demand for local securities from 
domestic pension funds. Once again, the Chilean experience demonstrates the 
stimulating role of pension funds on the development of domestic capital markets. But 
it also demonstrates how pension funds can generate macro-instability when the 
markets are not segmented and funds are allowed to invest abroad.
74 
Some economists oppose these soft controls because they limit the ability of domestic 
funds to diversify their assets. This is t rue, but all economic policies involve trade-
offs. Building a local capital market and domestic capital base is essential, and its 
benefits far outweigh the costs of controls. To  the extent that domestic institutional 
investors add to the pro -cyclical nature of open capital markets, they impose an 
externality on the entire population. Soft controls can help turn this negative process 
into a positive one for long-term growth.75 
Indirect I nterventions in Capital Account Transactions  through Prudential 
Regulations 
In addition to direct quantity-based and priced-based regulations, governments can 
use a variety of indirect measures to control (or at least influence) capital account 
inflows and outflows. The most critical use of regulations is to avoid currency 
mismatches in the balance sheets of financial and non-financial agents. 
Prudential regulations on the banking system are one such tool. Numerous countries 
forbid, or strictly limit, banks from holding currency mismatches on their balance 
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sheets. To avoid domestic financial dollarization/euroization, many countries also 
forbid financial institutions to hold deposits from domestic residents in foreign 
currencies, or limit the nature and use of such deposits. Bank regulators can also 
prohibit domestic banks from lending in foreign currencies to firms that do not have 
matching revenues in those currencies. For a more subtle approach, they can impose 
higher risk-adjusted capital adequacy requirements or additional liquidity and/or loan -
loss provisioning (reserve) requirements on foreign currency loans made to domestic 
agents who lack matching revenues. In countries with deposit insurance, the 
government can impose higher insurance premiums on banks that have riskier 
practices. These softer regulations would discourage ( but  not eliminate) the indirect 
foreign exchange exposure of banks. To reduce the maturity mismatch of non-
financial firms, regulators could similarly set higher capital, liquidity or prudential 
requirements for short-term lending by domestic financial institutions. 
Since banks traditionally mediate much of the capital flow in an economy, regulation 
of the financial sector has a significant economic impact. However, unless regulations 
focus adequate attention on the exposure of non-financial firms, the i mpact of the 
financial sector can be vitiated. For example, regulations that simply forbid banks 
from holding dollar-denominated liabilities might encourage firms to borrow directly 
from abroad. So banks must examine the entire asset and liability structure of the 
firms to which they lend (which they should do, in any case). Regulations can also be 
designed to directly  target borrowing abroad by non-financial firms directly. These 
might include rules on the types of firms that can borrow abroad (for example, only 
firms with revenues in foreign currencies) and establishes prudential ratios for such 
firms. Regulations might also include restrictions on the terms of corporate debt that 
can be contracted abroad (minimum maturities and maximum spreads, for example) 
and public disclosure of the short-term external liabilities of firms. 
There can be problems administering these provisions because corporations will have 
an incentive to circumvent the rules by using derivatives. To address this, 
governments should require full disclosure of all derivative positions.76 Foreign-
denominated debt can also be subordinated to domestic currency debt in bankruptcy 
proceedings. An alternative (or complementary) approach is for governments to create 
adverse tax treatment for foreign-denominated borrowing, especially when it is short 
term. For example, countries that have a corporate income tax with tax-deductible 
interest payments might exclude foreign-denominated debt from the tax deduction or 
make the interest payments only partially tax deductible.
77 
These alternative measures rely on a combination of banking regulations and 
complementary policies aimed at non-financial firms. The d irect capital -account 
regulations discussed earlier might be simpler to administer than such a system. They 
may work better because they are aimed at the actual source of the disturbance—pro -
cyclical capital flows. For developing countries with strong administrative capabilities 
and a derivatives market,  though,  a combination of direct and indirect measures can 
succeed in restricting flows and helping to limit circumvention. 
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Box 4: Accounting Frameworks 
 
Accounting frameworks not only provide a description of the economy,  but  also 
influence policy. Some  of these issues were addressed  in  the  discussion  or fiscal 
policy. This section will explore accounting frameworks currently used by developing 
countries, and discuss measurement and interpretation issues so that they can be more 
effective tools of economic policy. 
 
Most countries maintain accounts of the ir budget or fiscal positions (similar to cash 
flow statements for firms). The budget numbers are  often  used to serve several 
purposes. They provide a measure of government borrowing requirements, and a 
signal concerning the government’s balance sheet position. Ideally, there should be 
separate accounting frameworks for each of these uses. In reality, most governments 
use accounting frameworks that are a mélange; they provide only incomplete 
indicators for any of the questions of interest.  
 
For example, an accounting framework can suggest there is excess aggregate demand 
(inflation) when there  is not. Borrowing for investment has a different impact on 
economic well-being than borrowing for consumption, and should be recognized as 
such in the accounts. A balance sheet would measure assets and liabilities and net 
worth (the value of assets minus liabilities), and make this distinction clear. In the first 
case, assets would increase in tandem with liabilities; in the second case, they would 
not.  
 
One of the problems with this approach is that differentiating between true 
investments and consumption expenditures is not  always clear cut. For example, we 
typically treat expenditures on education as current expenditures (consumption), but 
they are really investments in human capital. Health care expenditures on children 
should also be considered an investment, while health expenditures on the aged 
should probably not. But such issues could at least be addressed with an appropriate 
framework. 
 
Some of the most striking examples of accounting failures include: excluding foreign 
aid from government budgets; consolidating borrowing by government-owned 
enterprise with the rest of the budget; accounting for privatization; and responding 
inappropriately to budget deficits t hat increase after the privatization of social 
security.  Even the standard measure of economic success, current gross domestic 
product (GDP), often suggests that the economy is doing better (sometimes much 
better) than it really is. We discuss a few of these examples in more detail below. 
 
GDP Measurement Problems  
GDP is  the value of all goods and services produced in a country (measured as 
government spending, consumption, investment, and exports minus imports). The 
problem is that GDP can rise even as citizens become poorer because the government 
might be selling national assets to foreigners, borrowing abroad, or using up its scarce 
natural resources. 
 
A better measure of overall welfare is gross national product (GNP). GNP includes 
income earned by domestic residents on investments abroad and subtracts income   56 
earned by foreigners on investments made within the country. Even better is net 
national product (NNP), which subtracts depreciation of the country’s capital goods. 
Measures of national output that take into account the depletion of natural resources, 
the degradation of the environment, and the assumption of risks are even better 
measures of well-being.  
 
 
Fiscal Accounting for State-Owned Enterprises 
Another example is the way developing countries are sometimes forced to account for 
expenditures of state-owned companies. As the IMF has now acknowledged, it has 
long treated borrowing by government-owned corporations in Latin America 
differently from the way this borrowing is accounted for in Europe. In  Latin America, 
there is a consolidated public sector deficit which categorizes this borrowing as an 
increase in the government deficit. In Europe, borrowing by public sector firms is not 
consolidated with that of the public administration. This means that the budget 
numbers for Europe and Latin America are not really comparable—a Latin American 
country in a similar situation to that of a European country will appear to have a larger 
deficit. Investment by public sector firms also implies that the public sector is 
accumulating assets, but such assets are not included in the accounts, which, generally 
refer to flows rather than balance sheets. Such differences in accounting practices give 
countries the incentive to privatize state-owned companies, even when there is no 
economic reason to do so. Even when there is a reason to do so, it would be preferable 
to use receipts from such asset-sales to repay public debt. But conventional 
accounting frameworks do not provide credit for doing so.  
 
Other Examples of Fiscal Accounting Distortion:  
Stabilization Funds, Land Reform, and Bank Recapitalization 
There are still other examples of accounting distortions. Some countries, such as 
Chile, have created rainy day, or stabilization, funds, designed to save surplus funds  
so they can be spent during an economic downturn. But if the budget treats these 
expenditures like any other form of deficit spending, it could look as though a country 
has exceeded the fiscal spending targets negotiated with the IMF. Not wanting to 
appear profligate could discourage countries from using the self-financed deficit 
spending that they need for recovery.  
 
Brazil is a country with enormous inequalities in income, wealth, and the distribution 
of land. Land reform holds the promise of increasing efficiency, growth, and equality. 
But inappropriate accounting frameworks are impeding land reform. In one of the 
better designed land reform programs, the government borrows money to buy land 
from rich landowners, using its  ability to buy privately owned land to turn it into 
public land to force sales at fair market value. It then lends money to small peasants 
so they can buy the land. If the government charges an appropriate interest rate on the 
loans, there is no real fiscal burden on the government. Of course,  there is  some 
probability the peasants will default on the loans, but in that case, the government 
repossesses the land and then resells it.
78 Traditional fiscal accounting, however, treats 
the government borrowing to buy land as a liability; it  does not  acknowledge the 
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mortgage that the government receives as an asset, no matter what the interest paid. 
Because the liabilities, but not the assets, are recognized, land reform shows up as 
deficit spending. Given the IMF’s strict deficit targets, land  reform becomes 
essentially impossible. Land reform must compete with all other expenditures even 
though it would be entirely, or almost entirely, self-financing with an appropriate 
accounting framework. 
 
In short,  fiscal accounting frameworks affect government policy and have enormous 
political consequences.  Avoiding the wrong incentives that accounting practices 
generate may require an entirely different set of rules than those used in current fiscal 
programs. In particular, it may be better to target the  current fiscal balance of the 
public administration (through a structural  ‘golden rule’, by which  expenditures 
should be financed by government savings, or a structural primary surplus), as 
discussed earlier, together with the consolidated debt of the public sector, including 
all contingent liabilities. 
 
 
Public Sector Liability Management in Developing Countries 
 
If domestic debt markets are thin, governments might be tempted to finance 
expansionary fiscal policies through borrowing abroad.  But this exposes them to 
greater future risk as a result of exchange rate changes, and undermines the role of 
exchange rate changes as part of the adjustment process. One reason East Asian 
countries did so well for so long is that their high savings rate enabled governments to 
invest at a high rate without borrowing from abroad.  It appears that public 
expenditures generally encouraged, rather than crowded out, private sector 
investments. (Indeed, the extent of the East Asian crisis was largely a result of capital 
market liberalization, which was something they need not have done , given their high 
savings rate.) For countries with high external borrowings, one medium term goal is 
to develop local capital markets so they can borrow in their own currency and 
encourage domestic savings. 
 
If foreign capital markets were well functioning, developing countries would be able 
to borrow abroad in their own currency (or in a market basket of currencies highly 
correlated with their own currency).  “Ideal” markets would enable the transfer of 
exchange rate risks to developing country lenders who can bear the risk more easily.79 
There have been a few instances in which this happened, but by and large developing 
countries have to bear the brunt of the risk of exchange rate and interest rate 
fluctuations.  What matters is not so much the source of the funds, but the risk 
associated with the debt, and given that foreign borrowing entails the imposition of 
these high risks, countries should limit their exposure.  
 
Severe currency and maturity mismatches in public sector debt structures are an 
important problem in many developing countries. Most long term debt is denominated 
in foreign currencies, while domestic debt is generally short term. Yet, with the 
exception of a few public-sector firms, the public sector produces services for the 
domestic economy (non-tradables) and public sector investments are long term.  
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The maturity structure of public sector domestic liabilities is also extremely important, as 
has been revealed in several financial crises. The basic reason for this is the highly liquid 
nature of public-sector securities, which facilitates asset substitution and capital flight. 
When most debt is short term the country will continually have to borrow to roll over 
their debts. With high gross borrowing requirements in periods of pessimism, the interest 
rate will have to increase to make debt rollovers attractive. Higher interest rates will then 
feed into the budget deficit, contributing to the rapid increase of debt service and the 
accumulation of indebtedness. In addition, rollovers of domestic private sector liabilities 
may be viable only if the government assumes the risks of devaluation or future interest 
rate changes, and this, in turn generates additional sources of instability. This was the case 
prior to the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Brazilian crisis of 1999, when fixed-interest 
bonds were swiftly replaced by variable-rate and dollar-denominated securities. 
Colombia, which has slightly longer-term debt (it has a tradition of issuing public sector 
securities with a minimum one year maturity), did not experience a substitution of similar 
magnitude during its 1998-1999 crisis.
80  
 
Although the fact that government revenues are largely related to domestic prices 
suggests that governments should borrow in their domestic currency, there are two 
reasons why this rule should not be strictly followed. The first has to do with 
macroeconomic management. The government should manage its external public 
sector debt to compensate for the highly pro-cyclical pattern of external private capital 
flows. For example, during phases of reduced private capital flows, the public sector 
can be one of the best net suppliers of foreign exchange, thanks to its preferential 
access to external credit, including credit from multilateral financial institutions.  
 
The second reason relates to the depth of domestic bond markets, which determines 
the ability to issue longer-term domestic debt securities. Well functioning markets 
require the existence of secondary markets and market makers that provide liquidity 
for these securities. In the absence of these pre-conditions, the government faces a 
trade-off between maturity and currency mismatches. It may make sense to have a 
debt mix that includes an important component o f external liabilities, despite the 
associated currency mismatch. In the long run, the objective of the authorities should 
be to deepen the domestic capital markets. Due to the lower risk levels and the greater 
homogeneity of the securities it issues, the central government has a vital function to 
perform in the development of longer-term primary and secondary markets for 
domestic securities, including the creation of benchmarks for private-sector debt 
instruments. The existence of a government bond enables the market to separate out 
sovereign risk from firm risk more easily, and some assert that this facilitates 
corporate borrowing.  
 
To be sure, there is nothing that is risk free. The domestic currency debt market may 
affect short-term capital inflows. The domestic government debt market can give 
foreigners easy access to short term investment instruments, increasing capital surges 
during booms and adding to capital outflows during crises. A liquid Treasury bill 
market provides investors the ability to sell the currency short, making it easier for 
speculators to bet against the exchange rate. But these concerns are probably  not 
sufficiently important that they should induce governments not to borrow 
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domestically (when they otherwise would have). There are different types of capital 
account regulations that can be used to address these risks. For example, authorities 
can ban foreigners from being allowed to buy short-term instruments; it can mandate 
that foreigners hold long-term securities for over a year, or it can provide incentives 
for foreigners not to speculate.  
 
Another problem is posed by the decentralized nature of most governments: many (or 
even most) sub-national administrations and public sector firms expect to be bailed 
out in case of a crisis. This gives rise to an important moral hazard problem. Specific 
legal limits and regulations are required, including clear rules on public sector 
indebtedness, direct mechanisms of control of foreign borrowing, and rules 
establishing minimum maturities and maximum spreads at which public sector entities 
can borrow. These rules should apply not only to the central administration, but also 
to autonomous public-sector agencies and sub-national governments.
81 
Conclusion:  Microeconomic Interventions and Other Hetero dox 
Measures 
 
As discussed throughout this note, there are many heterodox interventions that 
developing countries can use to stimulate their economy such as tax, banking, and 
other regulatory policies.  This  list of micro-interventions is not meant to be 
exhaustive. The point is a simple one: there is no reason to limit attempts to stabilize 
the economy to the standard macro-economic interventions.  
 
The claim is sometimes made that such micro-economic interventions should be 
avoided because they lead to distortions; however, there are several responses to this 
objection. First, in developing countries especially, there are limits to the 
effectiveness of the standard instruments; the losses from ‘Harberger triangles’ (losses 
in efficiency, from, say, tax interventions) pale in comparison with those arising from 
the underutilization of a country’s resources. Moreover, developing countries are rife 
with market inefficiencies; even in developed countries, capital markets are 
characterized by imperfections, many a ssociated with inherent limitations caused by 
imperfect information. Those who argue against these micro-economic interventions 
assume the economy is well described by a perfectly competitive model with perfect 
information and no distortions— an assumption inappropriate for even developed 
countries, but particularly irrelevant for the developing world. Well-designed micro-
economic interventions can increase the efficiency of the economy at the same time 
that they contribute to economic stability.  
                                                  
81 One way foreign lenders can reduce the risk of lending in local currency is through diversification. 
Domestic creditors generally have a concentrated risk in their own currency, but foreign creditors can 
take advantage of the low correlations between emerging market local markets and reduce the risk of 
any one local currency investment. See Dodd and Spiegel, 2005. 
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